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Abstract
Emergent networks like mobile ad hoc networks, sensor networks, oppor-
tunistic networks, peer-to-peer networks and social networks are introducing
new and exciting opportunities of communication between people and devices.
But these dynamic networks also introduce many security- and privacy-related
challenges. When dealing with complex and dynamic environments, informa-
tion about the current level of security or privacy, expressed in a quantified
manner, could be of great value in a decision-making process. In order to
derive such quantified measures there is a need for mathematical models for
security, privacy and trust. The development, application and evaluation of
such models are the topics of this thesis.
In order to obtain quantitative measures of security, a state modeling ap-
proach, which has traditionally been used to model dependable systems is
used. The modeling is based on the view that the notions of security and
dependability are integrated concepts, both describing aspects of trustworthy
computer systems. The state modeling allows for a probabilistic evaluation
of the security of the system, which can be used for security quantification,
prediction, risk assessment, intrusion detection and intrusion prevention.
The first part of the thesis describes a real-time risk assessment method
for computer networks using hidden Markov modeling. Hidden Markov mod-
els are well suited for the modeling of sensor trustworthiness in an intrusion
prevention system, and as a result of this research, a new method for aggre-
gation of intrusion detection alerts from multiple intrusion detection systems
is proposed. New security metrics for computer networks, such as computer
network risk, the mean time to next intrusion and the intrusion frequency,
are derived from the Markov models. Hidden Markov models are also used
for supporting the actions of agents in dynamic networking environments who
are faced with significant degrees of uncertainty in making decisions. Assum-
ing access to perfect information about the environment and the properties
of the interacting partners is unrealistic, but if agents are able to establish
appropriate trust in each other, the decisions-making process would be facil-
itated and the risk associated with the interactions could still be acceptable.
Trust may also play a significant role for the efficient operation of more general
multiagent systems. A novel trust model based on hidden Markov modeling
and reinforcement learning has been developed, where the measuring of agent
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trustworthiness is based on the predicted state probability distribution. Trust
modeling is also used as a basis for a decentralized reputation system suitable
for dynamic multiagent environments.
As infrastructures are gradually becoming more intelligent, trust may play
an increasingly important role in the interactions between network compo-
nents. A trust-based security extension to the mobile ad hoc network dynamic
source routing protocol is given, where the state probability of a node, accord-
ing to its corresponding hidden Markov model, is being used for deciding the
node’s trustworthiness. Nodes with different trustworthiness may be offered
different service levels based on a trust policy. Since network services normally
will be denied to untrusted nodes, an incentive for nodes not to misbehave is
created.
Users in dynamic networking environments like mobile ad hoc networks
would be particularly exposed to threats against their privacy since they have
limited control over the trustworthiness of network nodes that handle the mes-
sages sent. Appropriate privacy enhancing cryptographic mechanisms, which
can be trusted to work as intended, are required to handle this problem. A
novel approach to quantifying the amount of privacy that is offered by anony-
mous ad hoc routing protocols using conditional entropy is given, which takes
into account the proportion of adversarial nodes and includes the a priori
knowledge of the attacker.
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ITHESIS INTRODUCTION

Introduction
We are moving towards a future where dynamic networks becomes an in-
creasingly important part of our daily life. The Internet is already an essential
ingredient in the functioning of our modern society. Emergent networks like
mobile ad hoc networks, sensor networks, opportunistic networks, peer-to-peer
networks and social networks are introducing new and exciting opportunities
of communication between people and devices. On the other side of the coin,
these dynamic networks also introduce many security- and privacy-related
challenges. Examples of situations where innocent persons can have their se-
curity and privacy compromised, when using such communication networks
are:
A bluetooth enabled mobile phone downloads what appears to the user
to be a security update, but what is really installed is malware that sends
a copy of all her call logs and text messages to a remote server.
A person clicks on a link to a funny picture sent to him by his ’friend’
that he is chatting with on a social network. The url that he is clicking
on executes a malicious script in his web browser that steals session cook-
ies. His ’friend’ may now proceed with hijacking the browser’s sessions,
potentially impersonating him by gaining access to the web applications
he was logged into.
A person is surfing the web using her wireless home network and clicks
on a link to an interesting website. This website loads a malicious script
in the user’s web browser that takes advantage of a security weakness
related to the universal plug and play feature of her home router. The
malicious script reconfigures the router so that it uses a DNS server
controlled by attackers. The next time the user types in her bank’s
url, the router redirects her to a phishing website that collects her login
details.
These examples illustrate that users might have had their security or privacy
compromised without their knowledge at the time of the compromise, and
potentially without ever being made aware of this. When dealing with complex
and dynamic environments, information about the current level of security
or privacy, expressed in a quantified manner, could be of great value in a
decision-making process. An example is the addition of information about the
trustworthiness of the source of an application, presented to the user before she
makes a decision about downloading or not. In order to derive such quantified
security-, privacy- and trust-related measures, we need to have mathematical
models for security, privacy and trust. The development, application and
evaluation of such models is the topic of this thesis.
The main part of this thesis, Part II is a collection of six papers, Paper A-F.
Part I gives an introduction to the areas of research covered in the papers. The
different topics and application areas of the papers is illustrated in Figure 1
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Figure 1. The topics and application areas of the Papers A-F
The introduction is organized as follows. First, a general background for the
work is presented in Section 1. Then, the mathematical modeling approaches
used in this thesis are presented in Section 2. An overview of related work
is given in Section 3. The research methodology is discussed in Section 4.
Section 5 provides short summaries of the papers and identifies the author’s
contributions. Finally, a summary and conclusions are provided in Section 6.
1. Background
This section gives a short background for the work presented in this thesis.
First, some general approaches for increasing computer network security are
presented in Section 1.1. Then, mechanisms for securing ad hoc routing are
presented in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 gives a short overview of trust in multi-
agent systems. Finally, a short overview of challenges related to privacy in ad
hoc networks is given in Section 1.4.
1.1 Computer Network Security
Examples of potential threats against the security of computer networks
and the services they provide, are:
Eavesdropping of wired or wireless communication, leading to potential
disclosure of sensitive information and loss of confidentiality.
Unauthorized access to a database, leading to potential loss of integrity
and confidentiality of data.
Packet flooding of a web server, which may lead to denial-of-service to
customers and loss of reputation for a company.
Traditional security mechanisms, like authentication, encryption and access
control are implemented to prevent attackers from gaining unauthorized access
5to computer networks. However, these counter-measures may be circumvented
given enough time, effort and money. Since computer networks are vulnerable
to attackers, both coming from inside and outside the computer network, there
is a need for monitoring the network with the purpose of detecting and possibly
preventing security compromise. Normally, an attack is detected because it
has been successful, and we observe the consequences. To prevent an attack
from being successful, it must be anticipated or detected in an early phase,
before any consequences are observable. In the long run, attacks may indeed
be prevented by convincing potential attackers that your defense is so strong
that any intrusion attempts are futile.
Firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are traditionally used for
stopping suspicious traffic arriving to the network and for detection of suspi-
cious activity inside the network. Firewalls make use of static filtering rules.
With a proper configuration the most obvious malicious traffic can be detected
and denied to enter a network, but the more clever attackers can find ways to
circumvent these rules. Attacks at end users and organization internal services
launched from inside an organization can also not be hindered by a firewall.
IDSs may discover attacks based on anomaly detection or signature match-
ing, but have no protection mechanisms against these attacks. Intrusion pre-
vention systems (IPSs) are proactive defense mechanisms designed to detect
malicious packets embedded in normal network traffic and stop intrusions,
blocking the offending traffic automatically before it does any damage. De-
tection mechanisms are often based on blacklists, whitelists and thresholds.
Examples of prevention mechanisms are response techniques that stop the at-
tack itself by terminating a network connection or a user session or by blocking
access to a specific target. The IPS can also change the security environment
by reconfiguration of a firewall, router or switch to prevent access from specific
attacker IP addresses.
One challenge related to intrusion detection and prevention is the amount
of information that needs to be handled manually by a network administrator,
in the form of IDS alerts. The problem of false positives, i.e. false IDS alerts,
often makes manual monitoring an overwhelming task. The objective of an IPS
is to minimize this manual handling of alerts without increasing the amount
of false negatives, i.e. not suppressing the real alerts.
1.2 Secure Routing in Ad Hoc Networks
Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) consist of a set of nodes with a dynamic
behavior. They can join and leave the network at will, and quite often contin-
uously change their physical location. MANETs are self-organizing and can
be formed independently of fixed infrastructure. Some examples of MANETs
are:
A collection of laptops in the classroom communicating with each other
using standard Wi-Fi.
6A bluetooth-enabled network between PDAs with the purpose of sharing
files at a meeting.
A radio communication network established at an accident scene in a
remote area to facilitate communication between the different emergency
response units.
A vehicular network of cars communicating with each other and roadside
equipment which may be connected to the Internet.
The network can also be dynamic in terms of varying trustworthiness of the
interacting parties, and no centralized trusted third party can be assumed to
be present at all times. The nodes may also have limited computing capacity.
All these features of ad hoc networks lead to security challenges for the routing
mechanisms.
Security threats against MANETs could be routing disruption attacks, e.g.
replay attacks, black holes or wormholes, denial of service attacks or location
disclosure attacks. Routing disruption attacks can be defended against by
using cryptographic methods in order to provide integrity and authenticity of
the routing messages. Some suggested protocols, like ARAN [SDL+02] uses
certificates and digital signatures, while others rely on symmetric keys, mes-
sage authentication codes and one way hash-chains, like SRP [PH02], SEAD
[HJP02] and Ariadne [HPJ02].
Even though integrity and authenticity of routing messages can be offered
to some extent with existing protocols, the problem of nodes acting selfishly
by selectively dropping packets and not sharing their bandwidth with the rest
of the network, remains to be solved. The performance of ad hoc routing
protocols without any security extensions is severely degraded in the presence
of such misbehaving nodes.
If we accept the fact that we may have malicious nodes in our system, the
challenge is to detect them and find a way to monitor their behavior and pos-
sibly influence their actions, in order to prevent them from causing any harm.
Trust management serves this purpose by evaluating the trustworthiness of
nodes and offering different service levels to them based on a trust policy. An
incentive for nodes not to misbehave is created if network services are denied
to untrusted nodes.
1.3 Trust and Multiagent Systems
A multiagent system is a collection of mobile agents acting on the behalf
of humans or assisting human users in their decision-making. An agent is
an autonomous computer program capable of sensing its environment and
responding in a timely fashion to environment changes and also taking ini-
tiatives in order to realize its objectives. A dynamic multiagent environment
could for instance be ad hoc networks, opportunistic networks, peer-to-peer
networks, social networks or networks for electronic commerce. Application of
7autonomous agents in large-scale open distributed systems presents a number
of new challenges such as:
Agents with different characteristics can enter the system and interact
with one another.
Each agent tries to maximize its individual utility because it represents
a specific stakeholder with various objectives.
Agents may change their identities on re-entering the system to avoid
punishment for any wrong doing in the past.
Agents should decide how, when, and with whom to interact without any
guarantees that the interaction will actually achieve the desired benefits.
Agents are faced with significant degrees of uncertainty in making decisions
since it is impossible to obtain perfect information about the environment and
the properties of the interaction partners. If agents are able to establish appro-
priate trust in each other, the decisions-making process would be facilitated
and the risk associated with the interactions could be assumed to decrease.
Computational trust and reputation models seek to quantify trust as a
value derived from previous direct experiences and/or second-hand informa-
tion, such as recommendations, and suggest mathematical and logical expres-
sions for how to combine several opinions about trustworthiness into repu-
tation values. Such models are clearly needed in the virtual world where
non-human agents are making trust-based decisions. Also when a human end-
user is making the decisions, such calculated trust values can be very useful
as decision support.
1.4 Privacy in Ad Hoc Networks
Privacy has become an increasing concern for users of communication ser-
vices. As communication networks are becoming more diverse and complex,
users might lose control over their private information more easily. The
widespread use of mobile devices allowing for the continuous tracking of a
person’s location adds new aspects to the concerns related to privacy in com-
munication networks. Users in dynamic networking environments like mobile
ad hoc networks would be particularly exposed to threats against their pri-
vacy since they have limited control over the trustworthiness of network nodes
that handle the messages sent. Appropriate privacy enhancing cryptographic
mechanisms, which can be trusted to work as intended, are required to handle
this problem.
Anonymous routing protocols for mobile ad hoc networks aims at hiding the
identity of the nodes participating in the network and preventing the location
of these nodes from being revealed, including the identity of the users con-
nected to the nodes. Some examples of such protocols are the ones suggested
by Zhang et al. [ZLL05], Boukerche et al. [BEKXK04], Kong and Hong [KH03]
8and Seys and Preneel [SP06]. Most proposed protocols use a variant of onion
routing, where messages are wrapped in layers of encryption with the keys of
all intermediate nodes on the route to the destination. At each node a layer
of encryption is peeled off before the node forwards the messages in random
order. The privacy of the sender and the receiver of a message relies on the
fact that there should be no correspondence between incoming and outgoing
messages from a node. In practice an external passive global adversary could
just track the flow of messages through the network. To prevent this, an ad-
dition of dummy traffic and different mixing strategies are applied as extra
measures beside the routing protocol.
There are many challenges when constructing privacy-preserving protocols
for MANETs. There is always a trade-off between the cryptographic strength
of a scheme and its efficiency. MANETs may have constrained computational
resources and the routing function may deteriorate under delays due to the
heavy computations required for the security functionality of the protocols.
On the other hand, reasonably strong privacy is desired. This means that
there is a need for measuring the amount of privacy that is offered by the
scheme.
2. Modeling Approaches
This section describes the mathematical modeling approaches used in this
thesis, and the different measures of security, privacy and trust that can be
derived from these models. First, the modeling of security in computer net-
works is discussed in Section 2.1. Then the modeling of trust in dynamic
environments is discussed in Section 2.2. Finally the modeling of privacy in
ad hoc networks is discussed in Section 2.3.
2.1 Modeling of Security in Computer Networks
In order to obtain quantitative measures of security, we use a state modeling
approach which has traditionally been used to model dependable systems. We
base our modeling on the view that the notions of security and dependability
are integrated concepts, both describing aspects of trustworthy computer sys-
tems. Such an integrated modeling of security and dependability has now been
commonly accepted in the research community. Some examples of suggested
models can be found in [Mea95, MVT02, ALRL04, NST04, Jon06, Sal07].
The dependability of a system can be defined as its ability to deliver service
that can justifiably be trusted [ALRL04]. Following the taxonomy proposed
in [ALRL04] dependability can be decomposed into the aspects: availability,
reliability, safety, integrity and maintainability. Security is decomposed into
the aspects: availability, confidentiality and integrity. Dependability is an in-
tegrating concept that focuses on the correctness of services and the absence
of faults, which can be either natural, i.e. hardware faults caused by natu-
ral phenomena, or human-made but non-malicious, i.e. performed without
9Security update
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Figure 2. A state model for computer network security using the fault-error-failure termi-
nology
malicious intentions. Security, on the other hand, focuses on correctness of
services to authorized users and the absence of vulnerabilities. A vulnerability
can be defined as an internal fault that enables an external harm to a system, it
can be either natural or human-made, both malicious and non-malicious. An
example of a natural vulnerability is non-tamperproof hardware that allows
for side-channel attacks. A non-malicious human-made vulnerability could
for instance be the presence of software flaws allowing for buffer overflow,
caused by a programmer’s mistake or ignorance. An example of a malicious
human-made vulnerability could be the installation of a backdoor trojan on
a computer, performed by an intruder to allow stealthy remote access to the
computer for future attacks.
In the state modeling of security in computer networks we make use of the
fault-error-failure terminology known from the dependability modeling liter-
ature, as described in [ALRL04, Jon98, JSL00, Jon06]. This is illustrated in
Figure 2. The secure or correct state is defined as the state when the system is
in adherence to the security policy, and there is an absence of vulnerabilities.
When a computer network starts operating it is most likely already in the
vulnerable state, since the complexity of such a system makes it very hard to
avoid vulnerabilities, e.g. implementation or configuration faults. A vulner-
able state could also be denoted as an erroneous state in the dependability
terminology, since there are faults present which makes parts of the system
deviate from the correct state. These faults can be dormant, i.e. they have
not yet been activated causing any errors, or they could have resulted in latent
errors that have not yet been detected. Errors in the system may lead to a
failure when they cause the service delivered to the environment, i.e. users
or other computer systems, to deviate from the correct service in an unac-
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ceptable way. Such an error manifestation puts the system in the failed state.
Failures vary in severity and duration. In order to transfer the system into a
correct state a complete recovery has to be performed. This can be done by
different means depending on the nature of the error that caused the failure,
e.g. rollback of databases, reconfiguration, repair or replacement of physical
components. In most cases such a recovery requires manual interference, also
a diagnosis might be needed to identify the cause of errors. In many cases not
all internal faults leading to the errors which manifested themselves during
the failure are removed in such a recovery process. This means that we only
have a partial recovery where the system is up and running again, but still in
an erroneous state.
In the context of security, we can refer to faults as security breaches, since
we are concerned about the vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers,
i.e. unauthorized users or computer programs, in such a way that the service
delivered by the system deviates from the security policy. Security breaches
can be introduced into the system in the development phase or during opera-
tion by internal developmental or operational faults, or they can be introduced
by external attackers. A security breach can be compared to a dormant fault
or a latent error. It is something that makes it possible for an attacker to
launch an attack on the system. Security breaches might be removed from
the system before they cause any harm by security updates, for instance in the
form of security patching, security upgrades, reconfiguration or replacement
of components.
The moment a security breach is starting to be exploited by an attacker,
the system moves into the attacked state. Such an intrusion attempt might be
stopped by intrusion prevention mechanisms in the system before any harm
is done, or the attacker may simply decide not to proceed with the attack.
This leads us back to the vulnerable state. When a security breach is being
exploited and the system lacks means to withstand the attack, this may lead
to a security failure. This puts the system in a state where we have a detected
unacceptable deviation from the security policy, e.g. the confidentiality and
integrity of data in a database has been compromised. We denote this state the
compromised state. An attack might also be successful but undetected. This
means that the system state is deviating from the security policy but this has
not yet been signaled to the environment by deviation of the delivered service.
In this case the system stays in the attacked state until the attack is detected.
Depending on the nature of the attack and its consequences the system state
may then go to the compromised state.
The state model shown in Figure 2 is very general and could be divided into
more states for a more refined model. In Paper B we split the attacked state
into two different states, called intrusion attempt and intrusion in progress.
This is done because we consider intrusion attempts like port scans and au-
tomated scripts for password guessing as very common events that should be
distinguished from the real intrusions. A real intrusion could for instance be
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when a person logs on to the system using one of the guessed passwords from
an automated script and starts taking control of larger parts of the network.
In both Paper A and Paper B we merge the secure and the vulnerable states
into one single state, since we consider the probability of the computer network
being in a completely secure state as very low.
The state modeling allows for a probabilistic evaluation of the security of the
system, which can be used for security quantification, prediction, risk assess-
ment, intrusion detection and intrusion prevention. In Paper A the security
state of a computer network is modeled using a first order Markov model
(Λ,pi). The Markov model consists of a set of states S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN}, an
initial distribution pi = (pii), describing the state of the system when monitor-
ing starts, and a transition rate matrix Λ = (λij), describing the dynamics of
the system. A method for quantitative real-time risk assessment is proposed
based on observations from sensors, such as intrusion detection systems. In
this paper the idea of using a hidden Markov model (HMM) [Rab90] for the
modeling of the security state of each individual monitored network compo-
nent is introduced. Each network component may be monitored by several
sensors, and the output of the sensors could vary in accuracy. The trustwor-
thiness of a sensor is its ability to give correct observations about the security
state of the monitored network component. Since the real security state is
not directly observable, the true state is considered as hidden and the HMM
approach is used for estimating the probability distribution γk = (γk(i)) over
the states, where γk(i) is the probability that the monitored component is in
security state si at time-step k.
In Paper B the security state of the individual network components are not
modeled separately. Instead a common system model is used for the computer
network as a whole, while each sensor is modeled by a separate HMM. This
means that in a computer network with L sensors, each sensor ψ ∈ {1, . . . , L}
is modeled by a separate HMM (Λ,pi, Qψ) that includes the common system
model (Λ,pi), but uses an individual observation probability matrix Qψ in
order to model specific properties for each sensor. The matrix Qψ describes
the trustworthiness of sensor ψ. This approach facilitates the aggregation and
filtering of alerts from the different sensors, thus minimizing the amount of
alerts that needs to be handled manually by a network administrator. Alerts
are filtered according to alert severity, and used as observations in the HMM.
One common state distribution γk is updated for each new observation received
from one of the sensors.
Several useful measures can be derived from the Markov models. A measure
of risk is proposed in Paper A, where a cost value C(i) is associated with state
si and the total risk Rk for a monitored object at time-step k is given as
Rk =
N∑
i=1
Rk(i) =
N∑
i=1
γk(i)C(i).
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Figure 3. Architecture of an intrusion prevention system (from Paper B)
In paper B the mean time to next security failure (MTNSF) is derived from
the Markov model. This is done by partitioning the statespace S into good
SG and failed states SF , making the good states transient and the failed
states absorbing. The time to absorption can then be derived analytically
by estimation of the average number of times each of the transient states SG
is visited before the Markov chain reaches an absorbing state, denoted wi,
together with the estimated mean state occupation times hi. MTNSF is a
dynamic measure since the state probability distribution γk is used as initial
distribution when the time to absorption is calculated. A measure of the
intrusion frequency f is found by inverting MTNSF,
f = (MTNSF )−1 =
1∑
i∈SG wihi
.
This measure can then be used as input to a risk assessment component,
integrated in an intrusion prevention system, as shown in Figure 3.
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2.2 Modeling of Trust in Dynamic Environments
When we think about trust relationships in the real-life world, we base our
interaction choices on our opinions about the intentions of other persons. This
opinion is influenced by the outcome of previous direct interactions or second-
hand opinions in the form of recommendations or warnings. In cases where we
lack information from previous direct interactions it may also be influenced
by prejudice, meaning that we base our opinion on feelings and expectations
for a group that a person is perceived as belonging to.
In the virtual world we can also have opinions about other users, much in
the same way as we would have opinions of a person that we know in real life.
Normally the interaction partners that we are dealing with in this environment
are in the form of a computer program, a website, a network service provider,
etc. Also, the decision maker in the virtual world might not be a person, but
a computer program acting on the user’s behalf. Since the entities involved in
the trust negotiation are not necessarily persons, we refer to them as agents.
The probabilistic view of trust that is commonly agreed upon, and that is
most suited to the scope of our trust modeling, is based on the social scientist
Gambetta’s [Gam88] definition of trust:
Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective
probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents
will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or
independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context
in which it affects his own action.
This is a predicitive notion of trust upon which we also base our proposed
trust calculations. As the definition above states, trust is a subjective measure,
where different agents (trustors) might predict different probabilities concern-
ing the same agent (trustee). Reputation is often described as the objective
measure of trust. It is the general agreed upon opinion about an agent’s trust-
worthiness in a community, based on ratings or recommendations from its
members.
The model presented in Paper E consists of trust estimation and trust learn-
ing modules. The former and latter are constructed from hidden Markov
modeling and reinforcement learning (RL), as illustrated in Figure 4. The
model parameters of the HMM are re-estimated after having learnt about its
environment from the reinforcement learning module. The proposed method
enables the improvement of the model reliability when dealing with a dynamic
environment that changes over time.
We model the agent interaction as a stochastic process. The state of an
agent can be characterized by whether or not it is behaving in a malicious
manner in its interactions with other agents. When agents are interacting, an
agent makes its opinion about the trustworthiness of the other agent based on
the outcome of the interaction. After a random time interval these two agents
meet again and based on their belief about the other agent’s trustworthiness,
they may decide whether or not to make an interaction. Since an agent’s
14
Module
Reinforcement Learning
Module
Policy
Trust Estimates
Model Update
HMM
Action
Reward
Observations
Environment
Trust Estimation
Figure 4. Architecture of the trust model (from Paper E)
behavior can be changing with time it is not necessarily the case that an agent
is in the same state as it was at the last encounter. An agent can only do its
best guessing about the trustworthiness state of an other agent based on its
own previous direct experiences with said agent and recommendations from
other agents in the system. This means that the system state is hidden, and
hence we use the HMM approach, similarly to the modeling approach in Paper
A and B. The system we consider now is a multiagent system and we want
to use the model to estimate the behavior of each single agent. An agent in
the system rates the performance of all of the other agents with respect to
their behavior after an interaction, and uses an HMM per agent to decide and
predict whether or not another agent is malicious. The trust estimate is given
as the probability that an agent is in the trusted state, according to the HMM.
The HMM is updated from observations, in the form of ratings after direct
experiences, or recommendations requested from other agents.
The parameters of an HMM are usually set by oﬄine training of the model
with a large data set. Since we want the model to reflect the dynamic behavior
of the multiagent system and also optimize the agents’ trust-related behavior,
an online learning of the HMM parameters with reinforcement learning is pro-
posed in Paper E. Reinforcement learning (RL) [SB98] is a machine learning
technique for solving decision problems of mapping actions to states based on
interactions with the environment. The actions of an agent in the multiagent
system could for instance be a result of a decision of whether or not it should
interact with another agent, based on its belief about the state of the other
agent derived from the HMM. Such a mapping from state to action is called
a policy. In RL the agents learn policies based on feedback from the environ-
ment that is calculated based on a reward function. The RL framework also
includes a value function Q(s, a) which estimates the reward obtained if action
a is performed in state s. Q-learning [WD92] is a well-known RL algorithm
that updates the value function in each step so that the agent policy converges
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to the optimal one. Q-learning works even though the state transition proba-
bilities are unknown to the agent. In our approach we use the output of the
Q-learning to improve the HMM by updating the state transition rate matrix
according to the learned optimal policy.
The learning proceeds as follows: When an agent encounters another agent
it derives the current state probability distribution γk belonging to this par-
ticular agent from its corresponding HMM and execute the action with the
largest Q(γk, a). After the action is performed, the agent receives the reward,
the next step state probability distribution γk+1 is derived from the HMM,
and the Q-learning updating rule is applied. The process is repeated at the
next encounter between the agents. As the agent learns about the behavior
of the other agent through direct experience and recommendations, the HMM
parameters should be updated in order to improve the predictiveness of the
model. In Paper E we suggest that the state transition rates Λ and the obser-
vation probabilities of the HMM are updated after a predetermined number
of Q-learning steps by the Baum-Welch algorithm, which finds the maximum
likelihood parameter estimate.
An application of the trust-estimation approach using HMMs is given in
Paper D. In this paper a trust-based security extension to the mobile ad
hoc network dynamic source routing protocol (DSR) is proposed, called TSR
(Trust-based Secure Routing). The state probability of a node, according to
its corresponding HMM, is being used for deciding the node’s trustworthiness,
and the routing protocol is extended with a black-listing of nodes that are not
deemed as trustworthy. This approach prevents the selective packet dropping
behavior of selfish nodes that could not be detected with previous suggested
solutions. Packet-dropping nodes are excluded from the network, thus en-
forcing cooperation among nodes. Each node in the MANET monitors all of
its neighbors and uses an HMM to decide and predict whether or not each
neighboring node is selfish. This monitoring framework is based on a similar
theoretical foundation as the one described in Paper B. The TSR architecture
is illustrated in Figure 5.
A node in the network can be in a benign or selfish state at any given
time. The packet-sending behavior of the node can be modeled as a stochastic
process as it is probabilistic and described in terms of state transitions that
are triggered by events which happen randomly according to a probability
distribution. A node is selfish if it is dropping packets, not participating in
the forwarding of other node’s packets because it wants to keep all its resources
and bandwidth for itself. It can also refuse to participate in the route discovery
part of the routing protocol, making sure that it is not on the path of any route
originating from another node than itself. This can also be referred to as a
passive DoS attack.
It is assumed that when nodes join the network there is a small probability
that this node is in a selfish state, but most likely it is in the benign state.
After joining the network the node has a probability of becoming selfish or
16
Update HMM
HMM2 . . . HMMnHMM1
P
acket
B
u
ff
er
T
ru
st
E
valu
ation
Accept/Reject
Packet
Observation Manager
Received PacketOverheard Packet
HMM Manager
Figure 5. The TSR architecture (from Paper D)
malicious, e.g. it could be hi-jacked by an intruder or the intentions of the
person controlling the node may change. One example could be that a node
is acting benignly, forwarding packets for other nodes, but turns selfish and
starts dropping packets as soon as its available energy falls below a certain
threshold. When a node is dropping packets, this could mean that the node
is acting selfishly, but it could also be that the node is accidentally dropping
packets due to contention or congestion problems or broken links. Since a node
could be legitimately dropping packets without malicious intents, an observer
to the system cannot be certain if a node is selfish or benign, so the system
state is hidden to the observer.
As seen in Figure 5, every node in the network has its own local trustworthi-
ness rating of all other nodes in the network, derived from the HMMs. Obser-
vations that are used as input to the HMMs, can either be directly observed,
by overhearing the transmissions of nodes in the environment of the moni-
toring node, or implicitly derived from the source routes on received packets,
and from received or overheard route error packets. Whenever a node sends a
packet, it will monitor the next hop node to see if the packet is forwarded. If
it overhears a transmission of the packet from its neighbor, this is interpreted
as an observation in the corresponding HMM in the list of HMMs that this
node keeps updated for all of the network nodes. When a node receives a data
packet it will check the trustworthiness of the source, destination, previous
hop and next hop node, and only accept and forward the packet if all these
nodes are deemed to be trusted nodes, i.e. their trustworthiness is above a
certain threshold value. We refer the reader to Paper D for further details of
the routing protocol.
In Paper F we take the computational trust component of Paper D and E
and put it into a more general reputation system, as illustrated in Figure 6.
This is a decentralized reputation system where each agent keeps and updates
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HMMs, which are modeling the trust state of the other agents. Before an agent
(trustor) initiates an interaction with another agent (trustee), it looks up the
trustworthiness estimate derived from the HMM belonging to the trustee. The
trustworthiness estimate is given as the probability that the agent is in the
trusted state γk(s1). The trustor then decides according to a policy whether
or not to interact with the trustee. After an interaction, the HMM belonging
to the trustee is updated with a rating, good g, or bad b, based on the outcome
of the interaction. The HMMs are also updated with observations in the form
of ratings from other agents in the system, so called second-hand opinions,
which are either in the form of recommendations r, or warnings w.
Trust and reputation is an active field of ongoing research, it has been pro-
posed numerous different models for quantification and evaluation of trust.
The modeling complexity varies, ranging from very simple eBay-like models,
where a reputation value is calculated as the sum of ratings, to more sophis-
ticated models based on probability theory, e.g. the Bayesian trust and repu-
tation models [MMH02, JI02, BLB04, NKS07, JH07]. Bayesian trust models
are based on the assumption that the behavior of an agent can be described
according to a probability distribution. The trust value is a function of the
expected value of the probability distribution, which is updated with every
new rating received according to Bayes’ Theorem. Binomial Bayesian reputa-
tion systems, where ratings can be expressed by two values, good or bad, are
modeled with the Beta probability density function. Multinomial Bayesian
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reputation systems, that allow for ratings with graded levels, are modeled
with the Dirichlet probability density function. The objective of Paper F is
to evaluate our proposed hidden Markov trust model, by comparing it to one
of these trust models, namely the Bayesian binomial model of the Beta rep-
utation system [JI02]. The reason for choosing this model is that it is based
on a probabilistic view of trust, similarly to our model. It is also one of the
trust models in the literature that seems more adaptable to dynamic network-
ing environments where the behavior of agent’s may change over time, as it
includes a forgetting factor that discounts old ratings. The comparison study
is done with the help of simulations of different trust scenarios, in order to see
which trust and reputation system performs best with regard to reliability of
the calculated values under various hostile agent strategies. From the simula-
tion results we see that the hidden Markov trust model performs better when
it comes to the detection of changes in behavior of agents, due to its larger
richness in model features. This means that our trust model may be more
realistic in dynamic environments. However, the increased model complexity
also leads to bigger challenges in estimating parameter values for the model.
We also show that the hidden Markov trust model can be parameterized so
that it responds similarly to the Beta reputation system.
2.3 Modeling of Privacy in Ad Hoc Networks
The model for anonymous ad hoc routing introduced in Paper C is a prob-
abilistic information theoretical model based on the models for anonymity
in mix-networks proposed by Diaz et al. [DSCP02] as well as Serjantov and
Danezis [SD02]. The novelty of our approach is the application of the con-
ditional entropy measure of anonymity in ad hoc networks, that the a priori
knowledge of the attacker is taken into account and the inclusion of the quan-
tification of the amount of additional information the attacker will gain by
taking over more nodes in the network.
In order to properly define secure anonymous routing it is useful to have a
security model that represents the system and to have some sort of measure
that can quantify the amount of anonymity offered by the protocol. The
definitions by Pfitzmann and Hansen [PH05] are generally accepted:
Anonymity is the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects,
the anonymity set.
Unlinkability of two or more items within a defined system means that
these items are no more and no less related than they are related con-
cerning the a-priori knowledge.
For the ad hoc routing setting an anonymous routing protocol should ideally
offer sender and recipient anonymity, meaning that the sender of a message
or recipient of a message remains unidentifiable under the assumed attacker
model. We also want to achieve relationship anonymity between the sender
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and the recipient of a message, so that an observer cannot determine which
nodes are taking part in a specific communication flow. In other words, sender
and recipient are unlinkable. A sender or receiver of a message in a MANET
could be identified in terms of the node identifier, e.g the MAC address of a
MANET device, or the user identity, e.g. the name of the person controlling
the device. The sender or receiver could also be identified in terms of node
location. The method of analysis proposed in Paper C focuses on quantifying
anonymity with regard to location privacy of the nodes in the network.
The classic way of quantifying the degree of anonymity for a user, within
a set of users that could be the potential senders/receivers of a message, is
done by simply measuring the size of that set, the anonymity set [Cha81].
The size of the anonymity set is intuitively an indication of the degree of
anonymity, as more members of the set of potential senders/receivers, reduces
the probability that a randomly chosen member of the set was the actual
sender/receiver. However, we should also take into account that anonymity is
stronger the more evenly distributed the sending and receiving of messages by
the subjects within that set is.
Yet another way the degree of anonymity could be quantified is in terms
of the information theoretical entropy of the probability distribution that the
attacker assigns to each possible sender as being the originator of a message,
after observing the system. In a system with N users, let pi be the prob-
ability for user i to be the sender/recipient of a message, assigned by the
attacker, and let X be the discrete random variable taking the possible values
x1, x2, . . . , xN with probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pN respectively, the entropy H(X)
of the probability distribution can be calculated by
H(X) = −
N∑
i=1
pi log2(pi).
The entropy can be interpreted as the number of bits of additional information
that the attacker needs in order to definitely identify a user, or as the effective
decrease in uncertainty. This information-theoretic measure of anonymity was
proposed independently by Diaz et al. [DSCP02] and Serjantov and Danezis
[SD02]. For quantification of the degree of anonymity Diaz et al. compared
the information obtained by the attacker after observing the system against
the optimal situation where all users are equally likely to have sent/received
the message. The degree of anonymity is denoted d and defined as
d = 1− Hmax −H(X)
Hmax
=
H(X)
Hmax
,
where Hmax = log2(N) is the maximum entropy for the system.
Entropy may be used as a measure of how evenly the probabilities are dis-
tributed within each distribution, but two distributions with the same entropy
could still have very different qualitative anonymity. Another problem of the
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entropy measure is that it does not take into account the a priori knowledge of
the attacker. In an ad hoc routing setting, if we consider an attacker that has
both a global and local perspective on a network, we could imagine that the
attacker has some a priori knowledge of the communication patterns of net-
work nodes, derived from traffic analysis or from application-layer contexts.
The global attacker could for instance know the frequency of route request
transmissions from all nodes, which give rise to a probability distribution over
the potential senders of a particular message. This a priori knowledge could
then be combined with the information the attacker obtains by local obser-
vations, as suggested by Clauß and Schiffner [CS06]. As noted by Diaz et
al. [DTD07], the problem of how to combine the entropy measures from two
different sources has not yet been adequately addressed or fully solved. It is
not necessarily true that the entropy decreases when an attacker gets access to
more information in a given attack scenario. However, if we take the weighted
average of all possible entropies that the attacker can obtain after observing
the system, given the a priori knowledge, this entropy, defined by Shannon as
the conditional entropy, will always be equal to or less than the entropy of the
a priori probability distribution.
We are interested in knowing how many nodes in the network can be over-
taken by an attacker before the anonymity offered by the routing protocol
becomes unacceptably low. In order to achieve this we need to have a quan-
tification of the anonymity offered by the protocol in relation to the number of
compromised nodes as well as the total number of nodes in the network. We
propose to use the term Passive-c/n for an attacker that is an external passive
local or global attacker for the whole network, which is consisting of N nodes,
of which this attacker can eavesdrop on the communication of a subset of n
nodes, and that has compromised or owns c nodes inside the network. In other
words, the local or global external attacker cooperates with a local internal
passive attacker that controls c nodes. As we are focusing on the anonymity
aspects of the routing protocol in our model, we do not take into account an
active attacker that could inject, drop or modify packets in order to disturb
the routing mechanisms or to launch a denial of service attack. We assume
that the attacker carries out a probabilistic attack. This means that the at-
tacker obtains a probability distribution over which of the sender or recipient
nodes in the network that could have sent or is the recipient of a particular
message.
When evaluating the anonymity offered by a routing protocol, we are in-
terested in knowing how resistant the protocol is against possibly colluding
malicious nodes. To achieve this we measure the anonymity in terms of en-
tropy based on the external global view of the attacker before any nodes have
been compromised, and then quantify the average gain in information of the
attacker as it controls an increasing number of nodes in the network, using the
conditional entropy measure.
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Let X be a discrete random variable with probability mass function pi =
P (X = xi), xi corresponds to a node Ni in the network and pi is the probability
that Ni will be sending a message m, as viewed by the attacker before any
internal nodes have been captured. Let P0 be the discrete a priori probability
distribution with values pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ N in a network with N nodes. This a
priori probability distribution could for instance be based on traffic analysis
performed by the global external attacker. The anonymity of the nodes with
respect to this external attacker could be measured in terms of the entropy of
P0. In the case where an ad hoc routing protocol is resistant to this kind of
analysis by means of extensive use of dummy traffic we could imagine that this
a priori distribution is a uniform distribution with entropy Hmax = log2(N).
Assume that a node Nj is taken over by the attacker and that this node
receives the messagem. With the internal information of this node the attacker
could then possibly gain some new information about which node wherefrom
m originated, so that the probability distribution P0 can be updated to P1.
This new information can for instance be about how many hops away the
message originated. If the node internal processing of the message m reveals
the number of hops it has travelled or how many hops away to the destination
it has yet to travel, the attacker can in the worst case locate the position of
the sending or receiving node of this message, e.g. the message originated one
hop away.
In our measurement model we want to combine the probabilities assigned
to each node in this anonymity set with the a priori knowledge of the attacker,
to form the new probability distribution P1.
Let Y denote the discrete random variable with probability mass function
qk = P (Y = yk), where qk is the probability that a message m, received
by the attacker node Nj , originated at a node k hops away, according to
the knowledge the attacker can derive from the internal information of node
Nj . Assume that there is a maximum path length λ in the ad hoc network,
measured in number of hops. If we assume the local node attacker to have
no a priori knowledge of the probability of other network nodes as being the
originator of the received message m, the probability that m originated at a
node k hops away is given by:
qk =
ck∑λ
i=1 ci
,
where ck denotes the size of the anonymity set for a message originated k hops
away. The entropy H(Y ) = −∑λk=1 qk log2(qk) will express the attacker’s
uncertainty of at which node the message m originated, viewed locally from
node Nj . We will combine this entropy measure with the measure of the
a priori global view of the attacker using the Shannon conditional entropy
H(X|Y ). The conditional entropy is not a measure of the uncertainty of the
attacker in a specific attack scenario, but rather a measure of the attacker’s
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average uncertainty given all possible local observations:
H(X|Y ) =−
∑
i,k
P (xi, yk) log2 P (xi|yk)
=−
∑
k
qk
∑
i
P (xi|yk) log2 P (xi|yk).
The conditional entropy measure is the average entropy of X, given Y ,
weighted according to the probability of a particular observation yk. Let Z
denote the discrete random variable describing the conditional probability
that node Ni originated a message, given the observation yk. This gives us
the anonymity measure
H(X|Y ) =
∑
k
qkHk(Z),
where Hk(Z) denotes the entropy of Z, given the observation yk. In a specific
attack scenario Pk(zi) = P (xi|yk) would be the probability that Ni was the
sending node, derived by an attacker who has an a priori knowledge of P0,
and when capturing the message m can see that it originated k hops away.
In the analysis of a specific anonymous routing protocol we need to decide
what information would be revealed if a node participating in the routing
protocol is captured by an attacker. For protocols using variants of the onion
routing technique such information could typically be about the number of
hops a message has travelled from its destination. The next step of the analysis
would be to determine or estimate the size of the anonymity set, i.e. the set
of potential sender/receiver nodes, and then weight the sending probability
of each node in the anonymity set according to the proportion of adversarial
nodes as well as the a priori sending probability. Paper C provides examples
of the application of our proposed method of analyzing anonymity for the two
anonymous ad hoc routing protocols ANODR [KH03] and ARM [SP06].
3. Related Work
This section presents previously published research results which are related
to the topics of this thesis. Section 3.1 presents related work on security
modeling using Markov models. Section 3.2 presents related work on using
HMMs for trust and reputation models. Related work on trust-based security
of ad hoc routing protocols is presented in Section 3.3. Finally, Section 3.4
presents related work on the quantification of anonymity in routing protocols.
3.1 Security Modeling using Markov Models
Littlewood et al. [LBF+93] introduced the idea of quantifying security with
a stochastic modeling approach. Since then several papers on using Markov
models for security evaluation of computer systems have been published. Jon-
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sson and Olovsson [JO97] conducted an intrusion experiment where students
attacked a real system under controlled conditions. Their experiments in-
dicate that an attack can be divided into different phases where time be-
tween security breaches is exponentially distributed. The research project
SITAR [GPWW+01] presents a generic state transition model to describe the
dynamics of intrusion tolerant systems. Madan et al. [MVT02, MGPVT04]
derive several measures, like steady state availability and mean time to secu-
rity failure, using this generic state transition model. Singh et al. [SCS03] use
stochastic activity networks for quantitative evaluation of intrusion-tolerant
systems via simulations. The SITAR project also include simulations, using
stochastic reward nets [WMT03]. The modeling approach of SITAR differs
from our modeling in Papers A and B as they use a static Markov model of
the system while we use a dynamic hidden Markov model. Their approach
is developed for performing security analysis in the development phase of an
intrusion tolerant system, while we focus on the security of an operational
system. Since a computer system does not remain static under its operation,
a dynamic modeling approach seems preferable.
Markov models have traditionally been used to model and evaluate com-
puter system dependability, Nicol et al. [NST04] argue that some of the mod-
eling techniques used in the dependability community can be applied for se-
curity evaluation. Specifically, they suggest that Markov reward models may
be suitable to model security aspects of software systems. Sallhammar et
al. [SHK07, Sal07] describe a framework for combined security and depend-
ability evaluation of computer networks based on the model in Paper A, but
also including stochastic game theory for the modeling of an attacker’s behav-
ior.
Hidden Markov models have been used in IDS architectures to detect multi-
stage attacks [OMSH03] and as a tool to detect misuse based on operating sys-
tem calls [WFP99]. Khanna et al. [KL06] propose to build an IDS based on
an HMM with multivariate Gaussian distributed observations, and dynamic
re-estimation of parameters. In [KL07], Khanna et al. use distributed HMM
processing in combination with a proportional integral differential (PID) con-
trol engine to design a distributed IDS for ad hoc networks. Their approach
is different from ours as they are modeling only one sensor at a time and are
relying on continuous observations of network parameters.
3.2 Hidden Markov Modeling of Trust and Reputation
In [HCD05], a trust model using a Markov model is proposed by Hussain
et al. In this work, the Markov chain is defined as the chain of aggregated
reputation values corresponding to a sequence of consecutive time slots. The
Markov matrix of a given agent denotes the probability of the agent transiting
from one trustworthiness level to another based on its past behavior captured
using the Markov chain. In order to determine these probabilities, they use the
ratio of the number of times that the agent has transited from trustworthiness
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level A to trustworthiness level B to that of the total number of times that the
agent has transited from trustworthiness level A to any other trustworthiness
level. The future state vector of the agent is determined by multiplying the
current state vector with the Markov matrix. The same authors also proposed
a method for determining the effectiveness of their Markov model for predict-
ing the future trustworthiness value of a given agent by utilizing simulation
methods [HCD06]. Their modeling approach differs from our since they use a
deterministic state vector, while we derive a probability distribution over the
states. This results in a more realistic model, since we include the uncertainties
about which state an agent really is in.
Sassone et al. [SKN06] compare the effectiveness of different probabilistic
computational trust systems. They conclude that most existing probabilistic
trust models are unrealistic, as the models allow for no dynamic behavior, and
outline the idea of a trust model based on a hidden Markov model to cope
with this problem.
Hidden Markov modeling as a statistical tool has been applied to sev-
eral trust-related applications. Song et al. [SPX04] have developed a hidden
Markov model based approach to measuring an agent’s reputation as a rec-
ommender in a recommendation network. This approach does not consider
how the trust values are calculated. It focuses on the recommendation pro-
cess and models chained recommendation events as an HMM. The measuring
requires information about the topology of the recommendation network as
well as all the recommendation events. We have not included recommenda-
tion chains in our trust modeling and it would be interesting to extend the
model with recommendation chains. However, the approach in [SPX04] is not
readily applicable, due to the decentralized nature of our model.
3.3 Trust-based Security in Ad Hoc Routing Protocols
SAR [YNK01] introduces a trust-based approach to MANET routing. It
provides an extension to on-demand routing protocols like AODV (Ad hoc
On-demand Distance Vector Routing) or DSR (Dynamic Source Routing),
that includes a trust metric and allows for a negotiation of trust levels in the
routing mechanism. Nodes in the network are assigned different trust levels
depending on their protection mechanisms against routing attacks. The trust
levels can be defined by distributing one shared secret key among nodes at the
same trust level. In the route discovery using SAR, a field indicating the trust
level of the route is added to route reply packets. Routes with an assigned
trust level are guaranteed to only include nodes with the required trust level.
The SAR approach assumes static trust levels.
Watchdog/Pathrater [MGLB00] is a trust-based extension to DSR that aims
at detecting misbehaving nodes. The Watchdog method assumes that nodes
operate in promiscuous mode. Every node is monitoring its neighbors and
measuring the frequency of packet dropping or misrouting and updating a
trustworthiness rating of all known nodes. The Pathrater mechanism ensures
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that routing paths are chosen based on the nodes’ trustworthiness rating,
excluding routes with nodes that are identified as misbehaving according to
the Watchdog mechanism. As noted by the authors of [BB02], the Watchdog
and Pathrater increase the throughput in MANETs whenever packet dropping
nodes are present, but fails to enforce node cooperation since nodes that are
misbehaving do not receive any form of punishment. When misbehaving nodes
are excluded from routing paths they are actually relieved from forwarding
packets for other nodes.
CONFIDANT [BB02] is a reputation-based extension to DSR that includes
a monitor, a reputation system, a path manager and a trust manager. It
aims to detect and isolate misbehaving nodes by combining monitored and
experienced information of a node’s behavior with warnings reported from
other nodes. Cooperation is encouraged by imposing isolation of nodes that
are detected as misbehaving, since nodes in the network refuse to forward
packets originating from a black-listed node.
Another approach for stimulating cooperation by the introduction of virtual
currency was introduced in the Nuglets [BH01] and Sprite [ZCY03] schemes.
In these credit based systems nodes are credited or charged for the packets
they send, thus providing incentives for cooperation. The downside of Nuglets
is that its security relies on the use of tamper-proof hardware in every node.
The Sprite approach avoids this but instead introduces a centralized authority
thus violating the assumption of a decentralized structure of ad hoc routing
protocols. The upside of both of these approaches however, is that they do
not require the nodes to be in promiscuous monitoring mode.
Cooperation enforcement with a reputation-based scheme like CONFI-
DANT or CORE [MM02], where black-listed nodes are denied network
services, provides an incentive for node cooperation, but at the cost
of increased overhead due to the transmission of recommendations and
warnings.
The TEAM [BVTL07] model avoids the communication of extra packets
or additional headers for recommendations. Since a node will only forward a
packet if its previous hop, next hop, source and destination are trustworthy,
the recommendations can be derived implicitly from the routes contained in
the packets. This approach removes the problem of recommender’s bias and
the overhead caused by the extra communication involved in other reputation-
based solutions.
The issue of setting the thresholds involved when deciding whether a node
should be black-listed, in order to defend against selectively packet-dropping
nodes, is not considered in any of the above mentioned reputation-based ap-
proaches. If a node is detected to misbehave a certain number of times, this
triggers a negative recommendation. A selfish node may be aware of the
thresholds involved in the applied scheme and adjust its behavior accordingly,
selectively dropping packets, but staying below the threshold not to affect its
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trustworthiness metric. In Paper D we deal with this problem by using an
HMM for each node for detection and prediction of node misbehavior.
3.4 Quantification of Anonymity in MANET Routing
Anonymous routing protocols for MANETs, e.g. SDAR [BEKXK04],
MASK [ZLL05] and ASR [ZWK+04], have been analyzed in terms of
quantification of the efficiency of the routing mechanisms, but typically the
privacy offered by the protocol has not been quantified, only analyzed from
a qualitative point of view. The notions of weak and strong location privacy
are used in the analysis of ASR. A protocol is said to offer weak location
privacy if no one knows the exact location of the source and destination of a
message except the source and destination nodes themselves. If the protocol
in addition hides the number of hops to source and destination for all the
intermediate nodes on the route, it is said to offer strong location privacy.
Kong and Hong include the concept of traceable ratio in the analysis of the
protocol ANODR [KH03], which offers a quantification of privacy in terms of
the ratio of a route that can be traced due to the linking of node pseudonyms,
in relation to the number of malicious nodes on a route.
The analysis of the position-based routing protocol proposed by Wu
and Bertino [WB05], applies the k-anonymity metric to MANETs, where
k-anonymity [Swe02] means that the anonymity set is always guaranteed to
be at least of size k. The protocol is analyzed with regard to the probability
of keeping the required k-anonymity under different node densities and
radii of the anonymity sets, with respect to communication duration time.
This approach is based on the same kind of reasoning about anonymity as
introduced in the Crowds system [RR98]. This system is designed to provide
Internet users with a mechanism for anonymous web browsing by letting
users hide amongst a crowd of other users. A problem with this approach
when applied to the ad hoc routing setting is that the ’crowd’ of nodes might
be sparse in some applications, e.g. due to node mobility. The analysis of
the protocol in [WB05] also does not take into account the possible a priori
knowledge of an attacker.
Another approach to quantifying anonymity in MANETs based on
Dempster-Shafer theory [Sha76] is proposed by Huang [Hua06]. In this
approach evidence of communication is collected by measuring the number of
packets sent between sets of nodes within a given time period. Probabilities
are then assigned to all possible routes for these packets and the anonymity
offered is quantified using the Dempster-Shafer theory, which offers methods
for reasoning about the uncertainties involved in the evidence of communi-
cation. The analysis method in [Hua06] is interesting as it could be used
to monitor the anonymity performance of a MANET, if packets are being
collected and the measure calculated at regular time intervals in a monitoring
framework. However, the approach requires full knowledge of network
topology at all times, including all possible routing paths between nodes. In
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a dynamic network with mobile nodes, such a centralized monitoring system
seems impractical.
4. Research Methodology
The research is focused on the development of new theoretical models for
analyzing security, privacy and trust in dynamic networks. The development of
the models presented in this thesis was done by the thesis author in cooperation
with other members of the Q2S security research group. The research is based
on literature studies, group discussions and seminars, analytical modeling,
implementations and simulations and evaluation of simulation results. The
models have been published and presented at international conferences.
Some of the modeling ideas were implemented and tested by simulations,
to confirm that they behaved as expected in various scenarios, but full-scale
implementations and testing of all parameter variations for model evaluation
have not been done due to the time limitation of this work.
5. Summary of Papers
This section provides a short summary of each of the papers that constitute
Part II of this thesis and identifies the main contributions of each paper. A
statement of the specific contributions of the thesis author is also given.
5.1 Paper A
Real-time Risk Assessment with Network Sensors and
Intrusion Detection Systems.
This paper considers a real-time risk assessment method for information sys-
tems and networks based on observations from networks sensors such as intru-
sion detection systems. The system risk is dynamically evaluated using hidden
Markov models, providing a mechanism for handling data from sensors with
different trustworthiness in terms of false positives and negatives. The method
provides a high level of abstraction for monitoring network security, suitable
for risk management and intrusion response applications.
Statement of contribution: This paper was the result of a collaboration
between all members of the security group at the Q2S centre, and contributions
of the author were mainly in the discussions leading to the development of the
model used in the paper.
5.2 Paper B
Real-time Intrusion Prevention and
Security Analysis of Networks using HMMs
In this paper we propose to use a hidden Markov model to model sensors for
an intrusion prevention system (IPS). Observations from different sensors are
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aggregated in the HMM and an intrusion frequency security metric is esti-
mated. We use a Markov model that captures the interaction between the
attacker and the network to model and predict the next step of an attacker.
A new HMM is created and used for updating the estimated system state
for each observation, based on the sensor trustworthiness and the time since
last observation processed. Our objective is to calculate and maintain a state
probability distribution that can be used for intrusion prediction and preven-
tion. We show how our sensor model can be applied to an IPS architecture
based on intrusion detection system sensors, real-time traffic surveillance and
online risk assessment. Our approach is illustrated by a small case study.
Statement of contribution: This paper was the result of a joint work be-
tween the author, Kjetil Haslum and our supervisor Svein J. Knapskog. The
development of the mathematical model used in this paper is a result of dis-
cussions between all the authors and can be seen as a further development of
previous work on intrusion prevention systems by Kjetil Haslum. The author
was responsible for writing most of the paper, except sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
5.3 Paper C
Quantification of Anonymity for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
We propose a probabilistic system model for anonymous ad hoc routing pro-
tocols that takes into account the a priori knowledge of the adversary and
illustrate how the information theoretical entropy can be used for quantifica-
tion of the anonymity offered by a routing protocol as the adversary captures
an increasing number of nodes in the network. The proposed measurement
schema is applied to ANODR and ARM routing protocols.
Statement of contribution: This paper was written by the author, without
any co-authors.
5.4 Paper D
TSR: Trust-based Secure MANET Routing using HMMs
In this paper we propose a trust-based security extension to the mobile ad hoc
network dynamic source routing protocol (DSR), where the state probability
of a node, according to its corresponding hidden Markov model (HMM), is
being used for deciding the node’s trustworthiness. Our approach detects the
selective packet dropping behavior of selfish nodes that could not be detected
or defended against with previous suggested solutions. Packet-dropping nodes
that are acting selfishly by selectively dropping packets and not sharing their
bandwidth with the rest of the network, are excluded from the network. This
policy is enforcing cooperation among nodes and reduces the incentives for
selfish node behavior.
Statement of contribution: This paper was written by the author, with
advice and comments by Svein J. Knapskog and Bjarne E. Helvik.
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5.5 Paper E
Learning Trust in Dynamic Multiagent Environments
using HMMs
In this paper, we propose a trust model for autonomous agents in mulitagent
environments based on hidden Markov models and reinforcement learning. By
this combination, the reliability of the hidden Markov model will be improved
since its parameters are re-estimated after training of the model with the
reinforcement learning module.
Statement of contribution: Most parts of this paper, except some parts of
the introduction and related work were written by the author. The idea of
combining reinforcement learning with the hidden Markov modeling was the
result of discussions between the author and Mozhgan Tavakolifard.
5.6 Paper F
Comparison of the Beta and the Hidden Markov Models
of Trust in Dynamic Environments
In this paper we present a comparison of our proposed hidden Markov trust
model to the Beta reputation system. The hidden Markov trust model takes
the time between observations into account. It also distinguishes between
system states and uses methods previously applied to intrusion detection for
the prediction of which state an agent is in. We show that the hidden Markov
trust model performs better when it comes to the detection of changes in
behavior of agents. This means that our trust model may be more realistic in
dynamic environments. We also show that the hidden Markov trust model can
be parameterized so that it responds similarly to the Beta reputation system.
Statement of contribution: This paper was written by the author, with
advice and comments by Svein J. Knapskog and Bjarne E. Helvik.
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
We have given an introduction to the work that are presented in the papers
in the second part of this thesis. To summarize, the main contributions of this
thesis are:
Mathematical modeling of security in computer networks using hidden
Markov models for the modeling of sensor trustworthiness in an intrusion
prevention system.
New security metrics for computer networks derived from the Markov
models: computer network risk, the mean time to next intrusion and the
intrusion frequency.
The development of a new method for aggregation of intrusion detection
alerts from multiple intrusion detection systems in a computer network.
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A trust model for multiagent systems based on hidden Markov modeling
and reinforcement learning.
The measuring of agent trustworthiness based on the predicted state
probability distribution.
A decentralized reputation system based on hidden Markov modeling
suitable for dynamic environments.
A trust-based security extension to the dynamic source routing protocol,
with the purpose of detecting nodes that are dropping packets selectively.
Modeling of anonymous ad hoc routing and a new method for measuring
the amount of anonymity offered by the routing protocol using condi-
tional entropy, including the a priori knowledge of the attacker.
The mathematical models describe the behavior of complex and dynamic
systems, where human and non-human entities are interacting. The analytical
modeling approaches give an abstract view of the system, where simplifications
of the involved complex processes are needed in order to create a tractable
model. The statistical modeling approach using Markov models brings along
the assumption that the history of the system is contained in its state, i.e. the
behavior of the system is only depending on its current state. Also we assume
that the state occupancy time can be described by a probability distribution.
For the hidden Markov modeling we also have to include the assumption of
independence of observations. All these assumptions are simplifications of the
system behavior, which means that the models might not be returning fully
realistic results valid for a given real-life setting.
To improve the confidence of the modeling approaches, the models could
be further evaluated with simulations and tested with real-life data input.
In [A˚VVK06], the hidden Markov modeling of risk given in Paper A is evalu-
ated using two data sets based on real network traffic, with promising results.
This testing indicates that the risk-level estimated from the hidden Markov
model is indeed reflecting the true network risk, as long as the individual sen-
sors, i.e. intrusion detection systems, are giving reasonably reliable output. If
the sensors suffer from high probabilities of false positives and false negatives,
this will naturally affect the reliability of the calculated risk values. In Paper B
we model the trustworthiness of each sensor in the system and propose to use
a learning algorithm for estimating the parameters, so that the reliability of
each individual sensor is reflected in the model. This solution may improve
the confidence in the results of the risk assessment under circumstances where
sensors have variable probabilities of false positives and negatives, but this
remains to be tested on real-life data sets.
Another issue with intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems
that we did not consider in this work is the security of the implementation
of the system itself. The intrusion prevention system is an attractive target
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for attackers, it needs to be properly secured from attacks coming from both
outside and inside the network. An intrusion prevention system implementing
too strict security policies resulting in general low performance could easily
become a target of denial of service (DoS) attacks and could even suffer from
problems with self denial of service.
The hidden Markov trust model could also be further evaluated by a full-
scale implementation and simulations using a testbed for trust and reputation
models, e.g. the ART testbed [FKM+05]. Both the hidden Markov trust
model and the network security model using HMMs could be made more
refined by adding more states and observation symbols. However, this would
lead to a large number of parameters that would need to be managed. If
people without expert knowledge in security and statistical modeling are to
use these models, the amount of parameters should be kept to a minimum. For
specific applications of the hidden Markov modeling, the minimum number of
states and observation symbols required could be found dynamically by using
clustering techniques [KR90] on training data sets. One application of such
dynamic clustering for the purpose of detecting credit card fraud is given
in [SKS08]. However, such data sets may be hard to obtain in many cases
since organizations usually are reluctant to release this type of potentially
sensitive statistical material.
The observations used in the hidden Markov models which we describe in
Papers A, B and D are derived from monitoring of the network. The moni-
toring activity might conflict with the privacy of the users associated with the
network nodes, e.g. in the ad hoc network routing protocol we assume that
nodes operate in promiscuous mode. Adequate privacy-enhancing techniques
are required to ensure the privacy of users in such applications, e.g by using
pseudonymization of node identities. Anonymous routing protocols aim at hid-
ing the location and identity of network nodes. The application of trust-based
mechanisms like the one proposed in Paper D, seems difficult in combination
with anonymous routing as described in Paper C. In [BVTM07] one possible
solution for the detection of flooding attacks under anonymous communication
is proposed, but the problem of detecting anonymous packet-dropping nodes
in a general ad hoc network scenario remains to be solved.
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Abstract This paper considers a real-time risk assessment method for information sys-
tems and networks based on observations from networks sensors such as intru-
sion detection systems. The system risk is dynamically evaluated using hidden
Markov models, providing a mechanism for handling data from sensors with
different trustworthiness in terms of false positives and negatives. The method
provides a higher level of abstraction for monitoring network security, suitable
for risk management and intrusion response applications.
1. Introduction
Risk assessment is a central issue in management of large-scale networks.
However, current risk assessment methodologies focus on manual risk analysis
of networks during system design or through periodic reviews. Techniques
for real-time risk assessment are scarce, and network monitoring systems and
intrusion detection systems (IDS) are the typical approaches. In this paper,
we present a real-time risk assessment method for large scale networks that
build upon existing network monitoring and intrusion detection systems. An
additional level of abstraction is added to the network monitoring process,
focusing on risk rather than individual warnings and alerts. The method
enables the assessment of risk both on a system-wide level, as well as for
individual objects.
The main benefit of our approach is the ability to aggregate data from
different sensors with different weighting according to the trustworthiness of
the sensors. This focus on an aggregate risk level is deemed more suitable
for network management and automated response than individual intrusion
detection alerts. By using hidden Markov models (HMM), we can find the
most likely state probability distribution of monitored objects, considering the
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trustworthiness of the IDS. We do not make any assumptions on the types of
sensors used in our monitoring architecture, other than that they are capable of
providing standardized output as required by the model parameters presented
in this paper.
1.1 Target Network Architecture
The target of the risk assessment described in this paper is a generic net-
work consisting of computers, network components, services, users, etc. The
network can be arbitrarily complex, with wireless ad-hoc devices as well as
ubiquitous services. The network consists of entities that are either subjects
or objects. Subjects are capable of performing actions on the objects. A sub-
ject can be either users or programs, whereas objects are the targets of the
risk assessment. An asset may be considered an object. The unknown factors
in such a network may represent vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a ma-
licious attacker or computer program and result in unwanted incidents. The
potential exploitation of a vulnerability is described as threats to assets. The
risk of a system can be identified through the evaluation of the probability
and consequence of unwanted incidents.
1.2 Monitoring and Assessment Architecture
We assume a multiagent system architecture consisting of agents that ob-
serve objects in a network using sensors. The architecture of a multiagent risk
assessment system per se is not the focus of this paper, but a description is
included as a context.
An agent is a computer program capable of a certain degree of autonomous
actions. In a multiagent system, agents are capable of communicating and
cooperating with other agents. In this paper, an agent is responsible for col-
lecting and aggregating sensor data from a set of sensors that monitor a set
of objects. The main task of the agent is to perform real-time risk assess-
ment based on these data. A multiagent architecture has been chosen for
its flexibility and scalability, and in order to support distributed automated
response.
A sensor can be any information-gathering program or device, including
network sniffers (using sampling or filtering), different types of intrusion de-
tection systems (IDS), logging systems, virus detectors, honeypots, etc. The
main task of the sensors is to gather information regarding the security state
of objects. The assumed monitoring architecture is hybrid in the sense that it
supports any type of sensor. However, it is assumed that the sensors are able
to classify and send standardized observations according to the risk assessment
model described in this paper.
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1.3 Related Work
Risk assessment has traditionally been a manual analysis process based on
a standardized framework, such as [Sta04]. A notable example of real-time
risk assessment is presented in [GK04], which introduces a formal model for
the real time characterization of risk faced by a host. Distributed intrusion
detection systems have been demonstrated in several prototypes and research
papers, such as [SCCC+96, SBD+91]. Multiagent systems for intrusion de-
tection, as proposed in [BGFI+98] and demonstrated in e.g. [HWH+03] (an
IDS prototype based on lightweight mobile agents) are of particular relevance
for this paper. An important development in distributed intrusion detection
is the recent IDMEF (Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format) IETF
Internet draft [DCF05]. Hidden Markov models have recently been used in
IDS architectures to detect multi-stage attacks [OMSH03], and as a tool to
detect misuse based on operating system calls [WFP99]. Intrusion tolerance
is a recent research field in information security related to the field of fault
tolerance in networks. The research project SITAR [GPWW+01] presents a
generic state transition model, similar to the model used in this paper, to de-
scribe the dynamics of intrusion tolerant systems. Probabilistic validation of
intrusion tolerant systems is presented in [SCS03].
2. Risk Assessment Model
In order to be able to perform dynamic risk assessment of a system, we
formalize the distributed network sensor architecture described in the previous
section. Let O = {o1, o2, . . .} be the set of objects that are monitored by an
agent. This set of objects represents the part of the network that the agent is
responsible for. To describe the security state of each object, we use discrete-
time Markov chains. Assume that each object consisting of N states, denoted
S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN}.
As the security state of an object changes over time, it will move between
the states in S. The sequence of states that an object visits is denoted X =
x1, x2, . . . , xT , where xt ∈ S is the state visited at time t. For the purpose of
this paper, we assume that the state space can be represented by a general
model consisting of three states: Good (G), Attacked (A) and Compromised
(C), i.e. S = {G,A,C}. State G means that the object is up and running
securely and that it is not subject to any kind of attack actions. In contrast
to [GPWW+01], we assume that objects always are vulnerable to attacks,
even in state G. As an attack against an object is initiated, it will move to
security state A. An object in state A is subject to an ongoing attack, possibly
affecting its behavior with regard to security. Finally, an object enters state
C if it has been successfully compromised by an attacker. An object in state
C is assumed to be completely at the mercy of an attacker and subject to any
kind of confidentiality, integrity and/or availability breaches.
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The security observations are provided by the sensors that monitor the ob-
jects. These observation messages are processed by agents, and it is assumed
that the messages are received or collected at discrete time intervals. An ob-
servation message can consist of any of the symbols V = {v1, v2, . . . , vM}.
These symbols may be used to represent different types of alarms, suspect
traffic patterns, entries in log data files, input from network administrators,
and so on. The sequence of observed messages that an agent receives is de-
noted Y = y1, y2, . . . , yT , where yt ∈ V is the observation message received at
time t. Based on the sequence of observation messages, the agent performs
dynamic risk assessment. The agent will often receive observation messages
from more than one sensor, and these sensors may provide different types of
data, or even inconsistent data. All sensors will not be able to register all
kinds of attacks, so we cannot assume that an agent is able to resolve the
correct state of the monitored objects at all times. The observation symbols
are therefore probabilistic functions of the object’s Markov chain, the object’s
true security state will be hidden from the agent. This is consistent with the
basic idea of HMM [Rab90].
2.1 Modeling Objects as Hidden Markov Models
Each monitored object can be represented by a HMM, defined by λ =
{P,Q,pi}.
P = {pij} is the state transition probability distribution matrix for object
o, where pij = P (xt+1 = sj |xt = si), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N . Hence, pij represents
the probability that object o will transfer into state sj next, given that its
current state is si. To be able to estimate P for real-life objects, one may use
either statistical attack data from production or experimental systems or the
subjective opinion of experts. Learning algorithms may be employed in order
to provide a better estimate of P over time.
Q = {qj(l)} is the observation symbol probability distribution matrix for
object o in state sj , whose elements are qj(l) = P (yt = vl|xt = sj), 1 ≤ j ≤
N, 1 ≤ l ≤M . In our model, the element qj(l) in Q represents the probability
that a sensor will send the observation symbol vl at time t, given that the
object is in state sj at time t. Q therefore indicates the sensor’s false-positive
and false-negative effect on the agents risk assessments.
pi = {pii} is the initial state distribution for the object. Hence, pii = P (x1 =
si) is the probability that si was the initial state of the object.
2.2 Quantitative Risk Assessment
Following the terminology in [Sta04], risk is measured in terms of conse-
quences and likelihood. A consequence is the (qualitative or quantitative) out-
come of an event and the likelihood is a description of the probability of the
event. To perform dynamic risk assessment, we need a mapping: C : S → R,
describing the expected cost (due to loss of confidentiality, integrity and avail-
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ability) for each object. The total risk Rt for an object at time t is
Rt =
N∑
i=1
Rt(i) =
N∑
i=1
γt(i)C(i) (1)
where γt(i) is the probability that the object is in security state si at time t,
and C(i) is the cost value associated with state si.
In order to perform real-time risk assessment for an object, an agent has
to dynamically update the object’s state probability γt = {γt(i)}. Given an
observation yt, and the HMM λ, the agent can update the state probability
γt of an object using Algorithm 1. The complexity of the algorithm is O(N2).
For further details, see the Appendix.
Algorithm 1 Update state probability distribution
Require: yt,λ {the observation at time t, the hidden Markov model}
Ensure: γt {the security state probability at time t}
if t = 1 then
for i = 1 to N do
α1(i)← qi(y1)pii
γ1(i)← qi(y1)piiPN
j=1 qj(y1)pij
end for
else
for i = 1 to N do
αt(i)← qi(yt)
∑N
j=1 αt−1(j)pji
γt(i)← αt(i)PN
j=1 αt(j)
end for
end if
return γt
3. Case – Real-time Risk Assessment for a Home
Office
To illustrate the theory, we perform real-time risk assessment of a typical
home office network, consisting of an Internet router/WLAN access point, a
stationary computer with disk and printer sharing, a laptop using WLAN,
and a cell phone connected to the laptop using Bluetooth. Each of the ob-
jects (hosts) in the home office network has a sensor that processes log files
and checks system integrity (a host IDS). In addition, the access point has a
network monitoring sensor that is capable of monitoring traffic between the
outside network and the internal hosts (a network IDS).
For all objects, we use the state set S = {G,A,C}. The sensors provide
observations in a standardized message format, such as IDMEF, and they are
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capable of classifying observations as indications of the object state. Each
sensor is equipped with a database of signatures of potential attacks. For the
purpose of this example, each signature is associated with a particular state in
S. We define the observation symbols set as V = {g, a, c}, where the symbol
g is an indication of state G and so forth. Note that we have to preserve the
discrete-time property of the HMM by sampling sensor data periodically. If
there are multiple observations during a period, we sample one at random. If
there are no observations, we assume the observation symbol to be g. In order
to use multiple sensors for a single object, a round-robin sampling is used to
process only one observation for each period. This is demonstrated in example
3.
The home network is monitored by an agent that regularly receives observa-
tion symbols from the sensors. For each new symbol, the agent uses Algorithm
1 to update the objects’ security state probability, and (1) to compute its cor-
responding risk value. Estimating the matrices P and Q, as well as the cost
C associated with the different states, for the objects in this network is a
non-trivial task that is out of scope for this paper.
The parameter values in these examples are therefore chosen for illustra-
tion purposes only. Also, we only demonstrate how to perform dynamic risk
assessment of the laptop.
3.1 Example 1: Laptop Risk Assessment by HIDS
Observations
First, we assess the risk of the laptop, based on an observation sequence
YHIDS−L, containing 20 samples collected from the laptop HIDS. We use the
HMM λL = {PL,QHIDS−L,piL}, where
PL =
pGG pGA pGCpAG pAA pAC
pCG pCA pCC
 =
0.995 0.004 0.0010.060 0.900 0.040
0.008 0.002 0.990
 , (2)
QHIDS−L =
qG(g) qG(a) qG(c)qA(g) qA(a) qA(c)
qC(g) qC(a) qC(c)
 =
0.70 0.15 0.150.15 0.70 0.15
0.20 0.20 0.60
 , (3)
piL = (piG,piA,piC) = (0.8, 0.1, 0.1). (4)
Since the HIDS is assumed to have low false-positive and false-negative rates,
both qG(a), qG(c), qA(c) & 1 and qA(g), qC(g), qC(a) & 1 in QHIDS−L. The
dynamic risk in Figure 1(a) is computed based on the observation sequence
Y (as shown on the x-axis of the figure) and a security state cost estimate
measured as CL = (0, 5, 10).
Paper A: Real-time Risk Assessment with Network Sensors and IDS 43
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
chchahghahchchahahahahghahghghghghghchgh
R
is
k
Observation
Laptop risk based on HIDS sensor
(a) HIDS sensor
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 6
 7
gnangngncncncncngngngngngngngngnananangn
R
is
k
Observation
Laptop risk based on NIDS sensor
(b) NIDS sensor
Figure 1. Laptop risk assessment
3.2 Example 2: Laptop Risk Assessment by NIDS
Observations
Now, we let the risk assessment process of the laptop be based on another
observation sequence, YNIDS−L, collected from the NIDS. A new observation
symbol probability distribution is created for the NIDS
QNIDS−L =
0.5 0.3 0.20.2 0.6 0.2
0.2 0.2 0.6
 . (5)
One can see that the NIDS has higher false-positive and false-negative rates,
compared to the HIDS. Figure 1(b) shows the laptop risk when using the HMM
λL = {PL,QNIDS−L,piL}. Note that the observation sequence is not identical
to the one in example 1, as the two sensors are not necessarily consistent.
3.3 Example 3: Aggregating HIDS and NIDS
Observations
The agent now aggregates the observations from the HIDS and NIDS sen-
sors by sampling from the observation sequences YHIDS−L and YNIDS−L in
a round-robin fashion. To update the current state probability γt, the agent
therefore chooses the observation symbol probability distribution correspond-
ing to the sampled sensor, i.e the HMM will be
λL = {PL,Q∗,piL},where Q∗ =
{
QHIDS−L if yt ∈ YHIDS
QNIDS−L if yt ∈ YNIDS
. (6)
The calculated risk is illustrated in Figure 2. The graph shows that some
properties of the individual observation sequences are retained.
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4. Managing Risk with Automated Response
In order to achieve effective incident response, it must be possible to effec-
tively initiate defensive measures, for example by reconfiguring the security
services and mechanisms in order to mitigate risk. Such measures may be
manual or automatic. An information system or network can be automati-
cally reconfigured in order to reduce an identified risk, or the system can act
as a support system for system and network administrators by providing rel-
evant information and recommending specific actions. To facilitate such an
approach, it is necessary to provide a mechanism that relates a detected secu-
rity incidence to an appropriate response, based on the underlying risk model.
Such a mechanism should include a policy for what reactions should be taken
in the case of a particular incident, as well as information on who has the au-
thority to initiate or authorize the response. Examples of distributed intrusion
detection and response systems have been published in [CHSP00, PN97].
The dynamic risk-assessment method described in this paper can provide
a basis for automated response. If the risk reaches a certain level, an agent
may initiate an automated response in order to control the risk level. Such a
response may be performed both for individual objects (e.g. a compromised
host) or on a network-wide level (if the network risk level is to high). Examples
of a local response may be firewall reconfigurations for a host, changing logging
granularity, or shutting down a system. Examples of a global response may be
the revocation of a user certificate, the reconfiguration of central access con-
trol configurations, or firewall reconfigurations. Other examples include traffic
rerouting or manipulation, and honeypot technologies. Note that such adap-
tive measures has to be supervised by human intelligence, as they necessarily
introduce a risk in their own right. A firewall reconfiguration mechanism can,
for example, be exploited as part of a denial-of-service attack.
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Figure 2. Laptop risk assessment based on two sensors (HIDS and NIDS)
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5. Conclusion
We present a real-time risk-assessment method using HMM. The method
provides a mechanism for aggregating data from multiple sensors, with dif-
ferent weightings according to sensor trustworthiness. The proposed discrete-
time model relies on periodic messages from sensors, which implies the use of
sampling of alert data. For the purpose of real-life applications, we propose
further development using continuous-time models in order to be able to han-
dle highly variable alert rates from multiple sensors. We also give an indication
as to how this work can be extended into a multiagent system with automated
response, where agents are responsible for assessing and responding to the risk
for a number of objects.
Appendix: On Algorithm 1
Given the first observation y1 and the hidden Markov model λ, the initial state distribution
γ1(i) can be calculated as
γ1(i) = P (x1 = si|y1,λ) = P (y1, x1 = si|λ)
P (y1|λ) =
P (y1|x1 = si,λ)P (x1 = si|λ)
P (y1|λ) . (A.1)
To find the denominator, one can condition on the first visited state and sum over all possible
states
P (y1|λ) =
NX
j=1
P (y1|x1 = sj ,λ)P (x1 = sj |λ) =
NX
j=1
qj(y1)pij . (A.2)
Hence, by combining (A.1) and (A.2)
γ1(i) =
qi(y1)piiPN
j=1 qj(y1)pij
, (A.3)
where qj(y1) is the probability of observing symbol y1 in state sj , and pi is the initial state
probability. To simplify the calculation of the state distribution after t observations we
use the forward-variable αt(i) = P (y1y2 · · · yt, xt = si|λ), as defined in [Rab90]. By using
recursion, this variable can be calculated in an efficient way as
αt(i) = qi(yt)
NX
j=1
αt−1(j)pji, t > 1. (A.4)
From (A.1) and (A.3) we find the initial forward variable
α1(i) = qi(y1)pii, t = 1. (A.5)
In the derivation of αt(i) we assumed that yt only depend on xt and that the Markov property
holds.
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Now we can use the forward variable αt(i) to update the state probability distribution
by new observations. This is done by
γt(i) = P (xt = si|y1y2 · · · yt,λ) = P (y1y2 · · · yt, xt = si|λ)
P (y1y2 · · · yt|λ)
=
P (y1y2 · · · yt, xt = si|λ)PN
j=1 P (y1y2 · · · yt, xt = sj |λ)
=
αt(i)PN
j=1 αt(j)
.
(A.6)
Note that (A.6) is similar to Eq. 27 in [Rab90], with the exception that we do not
account for observations that occur after t, as our main interest is to calculate the object’s
state distribution after a number of observations.
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Abstract We propose a probabilistic system model for anonymous ad hoc routing pro-
tocols that takes into account the a priori knowledge of the adversary, and
illustrate how the information theoretical entropy can be used for quantifica-
tion of the anonymity offered by a routing protocol as the adversary captures
an increasing number of nodes in the network. The proposed measurement
schema is applied to ANODR and ARM routing protocols.
1. Introduction
There is a need to provide secure cryptographic services in dynamic net-
work environments with untrusted parties and a changing net topology. Cryp-
tographic services are security services implemented by cryptographic mecha-
nisms, examples of such services are confidentiality, authenticity, integrity, pri-
vacy, accountability, accessibility and nonrepudiation. Privacy is a service that
is often difficult to realize at the same time as other cryptographic services,
like authenticity, accountability and nonrepudiation. Parties in dynamic net-
working environments like mobile ad hoc networks, where each node is acting
as a combined terminal and router, would be particularly exposed to threats
against their privacy since they have no control over the trustworthiness of
network nodes that handle the messages sent. Appropriate privacy enhancing
cryptographic mechanisms, that can be trusted to work as intended, are re-
quired to handle this problem. Privacy has become an increasing concern for
users of communication services. As communication networks are becoming
more complex and diverse, the trustworthiness of network nodes, like routers,
cannot always be guaranteed.
In order to properly define secure anonymous routing it is useful to have a
security model that represents the system, and to have some sort of measure
that can quantify the amount of anonymity offered by the protocol.
In this paper we propose a probabilistic system model for anonymous ad
hoc routing protocols that takes into account the a priori knowledge of the
adversary and illustrate how the information theoretical entropy measure can
be used for quantification of the anonymity of the system as the adversary
captures an increasing number of nodes in the network.
2. Background: Anonymity Metrics
In this section we will give a short survey of the state of art on quantification
of anonymity.
2.1 Defining Anonymity
Before we can start with measuring anonymity we need to have a clear un-
derstanding of what anonymity means. We adopt the definitions by Pfitzmann
and Hansen [PH05]:
Anonymity is the state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects,
the anonymity set.
Unlinkability of two or more items within a defined system means that
these items are no more and no less related than they are related con-
cerning the a-priori knowledge.
For the ad hoc routing setting an anonymous routing protocol should ideally
offer sender and recipient anonymity, meaning that the sender of a message
or recipient of a message remains unidentifiable under the assumed adversary
model. We also want to achieve realationship anonymity between the sender
and the recipient of a message, so that an observer cannot determine which
nodes are taking part in a specific communication flow. In other words, sender
and recipient are unlinkable. Note that the unlinkability property is weaker
than the anonymity property, as anonymity of both sender and recipient im-
plies the unlinkabilty between them. For the remaining of this paper we will
focus on anonymity in the context of ad hoc routing, and in particular look at
sender and recipient anonymity in the route discovery part of ad hoc routing
protocols.
An identity is defined in [PH05] as any subset of attributes of an individual
which identifies this individual within any set of individuals. So usually there
is no such thing as the identity, but several of them. The nodes in an ad hoc
network could be identified in terms of a node identifier. A node identifier
could for instance be the node’s mac address or ip address, or the identity of
the user controlling the node at the time. We will assume that every node in a
network of N nodes has a unique authenticated node identifier Ni, 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
A node could also be identified by its location, signal positioning could easily be
used to determine an approximate location of a transmitting node. To obtain
location privacy of a sender node a packet should not reveal the number of
hops it has travelled. The packet should also not reveal how many hops it has
left to traverse before arriving at the destination in order to obtain recipient
location privacy.
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2.2 Measuring Anonymity
The classic way of quantifying the degree of anonymity is done by simply
measuring the size of the anonymity set [Cha81]. The size of the anonymity
set is intuitively an indication of the degree of anonymity, as the more mem-
bers of the set of potential senders/receivers, the less is the probability that
a randomly chosen member of the set was the actual sender/receiver. But
we should take into account that anonymity is stronger the more evenly dis-
tributed the sending and receiving of messages by the subjects within that set
is.
Reiter and Rubin [RR98] give a qualitative scale for degrees of anonymity
ranging from absolute privacy to provable exposed :
absolute privacy means that sending a message is unobservable for the
attacker
beyond suspicion means that even though the attacker can see evidence
of a sent message, the sender appears no more likely to be the originator
than any other potential sender in the system
probable innocence means that to the attacker, the sender appears no
more likely to be the originator than to not be the originator
exposed means that the attacker can identify the sender of a message
provable exposed means that the attacker can also prove the identity of
the sender to others
The degree of anonymity could also be quantified in terms of the information
theoretical entropy of the probability distribution that the attacker assigns to
each possible sender as being the originator of a message, after observing the
system. In a system with N users, let pi be the probability assigned by the
attacker for user i to be the sender/recipient of a message, and let X be
the discrete random variable taking the possible values x1, x2, . . . , xN with
probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pN respectively, the entropy H(X) of the probability
distribution can be calculated by
H(X) = −
N∑
i=1
pi log2(pi). (1)
The entropy can be interpreted as the number of bits of additional information
that the attacker needs in order to definitely identify a user, or as the effective
decrease in uncertainty. This information-theoretic measure of anonymity was
proposed independently by Diaz et al [DSCP02] and Serjantov and Danezis
[SD02]. For quantification of the degree of anonymity Diaz et al compared the
information obtained by the attacker after observing the system against the
optimal situation where all users are equally likely to have sent/received the
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message. The degree of anonymity is denoted d and defined as
d = 1− Hmax −H(X)
Hmax
=
H(X)
Hmax
,
where Hmax = log2(N) is the maximum entropy for the system. This measure
tells us how evenly distributed the probabilities within the anonymity set are.
Entropy may be used as a measure of how evenly the probabilities are dis-
tributed within each distribution, but two distributions with the same entropy
could still have very different qualitative anonymity. In particular the beyond
suspicion property could be broken even with high entropy, since a distribu-
tion of high entropy does not necessarily guarantee that a particular sender
or recipient does not have a much higher probability to have sent or received
a message than the rest of the potential senders/receivers. Some examples
of such probability distributions are given by To´th et al [THV04]. To cap-
ture this they suggest to use the worst case metric minimum entropy Hmin,
which denotes the probability of the most likely sender/receiver within the
anonymity set
Hmin = − log2( max
1≤i≤N
(pi)).
This measure was also used by Shmatikov and Wang [SW06] to calculate the
relationship anonymity between sender and recipient in several simulations of
mix networks, where they take into account the route selection mechanisms
and the distribution of message destinations.
Another problem of the entropy measure is that it does not take into ac-
count the a priori knowledge of the adversary. In an ad hoc routing setting,
if we consider an adversary that has both a global and local perspective on a
network, we could imagine that the adversary has some a priori knowledge of
the communication patterns of network nodes, derived from traffic analysis or
from application-layer contexts. The global adversary could for instance know
about the frequency of route request transmissions from all nodes, which give
rise to a probability distribution over the potential senders of a particular mes-
sage. This a priori knowledge could then be combined with the information the
adversary obtains by local observations, as suggested by Clauß and Schiffner
[CS06]. As noted by Diaz et al [DTD07], the problem of how to combine the
entropy measures from two different sources has not yet been fully addressed.
It is not necessarily true that the entropy decreases when an adversary gets
access to more information in a given attack scenario. However, if we take the
weighted average of all possible entropies that the adversary can obtain after
observing the system, given the a priori knowledge, this entropy, defined by
Shannon as the conditional entropy, will always be equal or less to the entropy
of the a priori probability distribution.
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3. Model Description
The security model for anonymous ad hoc routing introduced in this paper
is a probabilistic information theoretical model based on the models for
anonymity in mix-networks proposed by Diaz et al [DSCP02] and Serjantov
and Danezis [SD02]. The novelty of our approach is that we apply the
conditional entropy measure of anonymity to ad hoc networks, that we take
into account the a priori knowledge of the adversary and that we quantify
the amount of additional information the adversary will gain by taking over
more nodes in the network.
3.1 Adversary Model
The ad hoc network consists of a collection of nodes that can come and
go into the network, the nodes simultaneously act as senders, recipients and
routers. An adversary model usually distinguishes between external/internal,
passive/active and global/local adversaries. An external adversary can only
capture the communication between nodes while the internal adversary has
access to all internal information of compromised nodes. A passive adversary
can only eavesdrop on the communication or read the internal information of
nodes, while an active adversary may insert, delete or modify messages or alter
internal information in nodes. A global adversary has full information of the
network while a local adversary only controls part of the network. The most
common adversary model used when analyzing the anonymity offered by ad
hoc routing protocols is an external passive global adversary (an eavesdropper
on the wireless communication of all nodes in the network), that possibly coop-
erates with one or more internal passive or active local adversaries (malicious
nodes inside the network). The proposals for anonymous routing protocols by
Zhang et al [ZLL05], Boukerche et al [BEKXK04], Kong and Hong [KH03]
and Seys and Preneel [SP06] all use variants of this adversary model.
Hu and Perrig [HP04] propose to characterize an adversary based on the
number of nodes it owns in the network and the number of nodes it has com-
promised, they suggest to use the notation Active-n-m for an active adversary
that has compromised n nodes and owns m nodes. We do not wish to separate
between owned and compromised nodes, as we assume that a compromised
node is fully controlled by the adversary. We are interested in knowing how
many nodes in the network that can be overtaken by an adversary before the
anonymity offered by the routing protocol gets unacceptably low. In order to
achieve this we need to have a quantification of the anonymity offered by the
protocol in relation to the number of compromised nodes as well as the total
number of nodes in the network. We propose to use the term Passive-c/n for
an adversary that is an external passive local or global adversary for the whole
network, which is consisting of N nodes, of which this adversary can eavesdrop
on the communication of a subset of n nodes, and that has compromised or
owns c nodes inside the network, in other words the local or global external
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adversary cooperates with a local internal passive adversary that controls c
nodes. As we are focusing on the anonymity aspects of the routing protocol
we do not in our model take into account an active adversary that could in-
ject, drop or modify packets in order to disturb the routing mechanisms or to
launch a denial of service attack.
We assume that the adversary carries out a probabilistic attack, this means
that the adversary obtains a probability distribution over the potential sender
or recipient nodes in the network that could have sent or is the recipient of
a particular message. Depending on the number of nodes controlled by the
adversary, this probability distribution will vary. The worst case scenario
is a Passive-N/N adversary, which is a rather uninteresting case since the
adversary controls all nodes in the network. For the case study used in this
paper we assume that the external adversary has a global view of the network.
This means that the weakest adversary in our model will be a Passive-0/N
adversary, which is a global external adversary without any knowledge of any
internal node’s information.
3.2 Network Topology Model
We choose to use an analytical probabilistic model of the ad hoc network
topology, because we want the measurement model to be as general as possible
to be able to compare different protocols not only for specific network topolo-
gies and specific attack scenarios. An alternative to our analytical approach
could be to use simulations, where the anonymity measure is calculated over
many different simulated network topologies and routes. When concerning the
mobility of nodes this would indeed be a better solution and will be investi-
gated in our further work. It should be noted that the proposed measurement
model is resistant on the net topology, so our approach could still be applied
to other network topology models.
The analytical network topology model requires some simplifying assump-
tions. Inspired by the topological model used in [Sey06] we assume that at
any given time the network nodes are evenly distributed on a two-dimensional
plane and that all nodes have an equal transmission range and communicate
through a wireless symmetric channel. We also assume that routes follow
shortest distance paths, so that a message transmitted from node N1 to node
N2 could not have originated from a node closer to N2 than to N1. We re-
fer to the node density ρ as the number of nodes that lie within each node’s
transmission range. Let c1 be the number of nodes that are one hop away
from any particular network node, c2 denotes the number of nodes two hops
away and so on. We define c0 = 1, as the only node zero hops away from
any node is the node itself. As the hop-count increases from k − 1 hops to k
hops, the number of nodes grows proportionally according to the number of
nodes contained within the area difference of two concentric circles with radii
k and k− 1. The number of nodes k hops away from a particular node will be
ck = (1/2)ρ(2k − 1).
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3.3 Measurement Model
When evaluating the anonymity offered by a routing protocol, we are in-
terested in knowing how resistant the protocol is against possibly colluding
malicious nodes. To achieve this we measure the anonymity in terms of en-
tropy based on the external global view of the adversary before any nodes
have been compromised, and then quantify the average gain in information
of the adversary as it controls an increasing number of nodes in the network,
using the conditional entropy measure and following some of the discussion
about this measure by Diaz et al [DTD07]. In the following we will only dis-
cuss sender anonymity, with minor adjustments the same reasoning can also
be applied to recipient anonymity.
Let X be a discrete random variable with probability mass function pi =
P (X = xi), xi corresponds to a node Ni in the network and pi is the probability
that Ni will be sending a message m, as viewed by the adversary before any
internal nodes have been captured. Let P0 be the discrete a priori probability
distribution with values pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ N in a network with N nodes. This a
priori probability distribution could for instance be based on traffic analysis
performed by the global external adversary. The anonymity of the nodes with
respect to this external adversary could be measured in terms of the entropy
of P0, as given by Equation 1. In the case where an ad hoc routing protocol
is resistant to this kind of analysis by means of extensive use of dummy traffic
we could imagine that this a priori distribution is a uniform distribution with
entropy Hmax = log2(N).
Assume that a node Nj is taken over by the adversary, and that this node
receives the message m. With the internal information of this node the adver-
sary could then possibly gain some new information about which node that
originated m, so that the probability distribution P0 can be updated to P1. As
will be illustrated by the examples later this new information can for instance
be about how many hops away the message was originated. If the node inter-
nal processing of the message m reveals the number of hops it has travelled
or how many hops away to the destination it has left to travel, the adversary
can in the worst case locate the position of the sending or receiving node of
this message, e.g. the message was originated one hop away. If the message
reveals that it was generated k hops away, the size of the anonymity set for
the sending node will be
ck = (1/2)ρ(2k − 1).
In our measurement model we want to combine the probabilities assigned to
each node in this anonymity set with the a priori knowledge of the adversary,
to form the new probability distribution P1.
Let Y denote the discrete random variable with probability mass function
qk = P (Y = yk), where qk is the probability that a message m, received by
the adversary node Nj , was originated at node k hops away, according to
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the knowledge the adversary can derive from the internal information of node
Nj . Assume that there is a maximum path length λ in the ad hoc network,
measured in number of hops. If we assume the local node adversary to have
no a priori knowledge of the probability of other network nodes as being the
originator of the received message m, the probability that m was originated
at a node k hops away is given by:
qk =
ck∑λ
i=1 ci
(2)
The entropy H(Y ) = −∑λk=1 qk log2(qk) will express the adversary’s uncer-
tainty on which node that originated the message m, viewed locally from node
Nj , we will combine this entropy measure with the measure of the a priori
global view of the adversary using the Shannon conditional entropy H(X|Y ).
The conditional entropy is not a measure of the uncertainty of the adversary
in a specific attack scenario, but rather a measure of the adversary’s average
uncertainty given all possible local observations:
H(X|Y ) =−
∑
i,k
P (xi, yk) log2 P (xi|yk)
=−
∑
k
qk
∑
i
P (xi|yk) log2 P (xi|yk).
The conditional entropy measure is the average entropy of X, given Y ,
weighted according to the probability of getting a particular observation
yk. Let Z denote the discrete random variable describing the conditional
probability that node Ni originated a message, given the observation yk.
Thus we have that Pk(zi) = P (xi|yk) and
H(X|Y ) =
∑
k
qkHk(Z), (3)
where Hk(Z) denotes the entropy of Z, given the observation yk. In a specific
attack scenario Pk(zi) would be the probability that Ni was the sending node,
derived by an adversary that has an a priori knowledge of P0, and that by the
capturing of the message m can see that it was originated k hops away.
In the case where P0 is uniformly distributed, the adversary only controls
one network node and the adversary can derive that the message m, received
by the network node controlled by the adversary, was generated k hops away,
this observation will limit the set of potential sending nodes to only the nodes
that are located k hops away. In this case the entropy measure will be reduced
from H(X) = Hmax = log2(N) without any observations, to Hk(Z) = log2(ck)
given this particular observation.
If an adversary controls more than one node in the network, the anonymity
set of senders, given an observed message arriving at one of the adversarial
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nodes, could be further reduced. If the adversary controls half of the nodes in
the network, that is we have a Passive-N2 /N adversary, we could assume that
on average half of the nodes in the anonymity set would be adversarial. In
that case we can derive Hk(Z) = log2(
ck
2 ), and insert this into the conditional
entropy measure given in Equation 3. More generally, if the adversary controls
c out of N network nodes we get the measure Hk(Z) = log2((1− cN )ck).
If the adversary has some a priori knowledge of the node’s communication
patterns, P0 will not be uniformly distributed. In this case we will have to
find the value of Pk(zi) = P (xi|yk), which can be rewritten using Bayes’ rule
as
P (xi|yk) = P (yk|xi)P (xi)∑N
i=1 P (yk|xi)P (xi)
, (4)
where P (yk|xi) is the probability that a node observes that a message was
originated k hops away, given that node Ni generated this message. As we
will see in the examples in the following section, this probability can be derived
from properties of the specific routing protocol being used.
4. Examples of Measuring Anonymity
In this section we will illustrate by two examples of anonymous ad hoc rout-
ing protocols how the entropy measure can be used for quantification of the
anonymity of an ad hoc routing protocol with respect to the previously de-
scribed adversary model. We will first introduce the concept of onion routing,
which is a technique used in different variations in many proposed anonymous
routing protocols.
4.1 Onion routing
Onion routing is a variant of Chaum’s mix-networks [Cha81], where mes-
sages are wrapped in layers of encryption with the keys of all intermediate
nodes on the route to the destination. At each node a layer of encryption is
peeled off before the node forwards the messages in random order. If for ex-
ample a message m is to be sent from the node N1 to N4 via the intermediate
nodes N2 and N3, the message sent to N2 from N1 would be
{N3, {N4, {m}k4}k3}k2 ,
where the ki are secret keys shared between N1 and all the other nodes on the
route. This message is called an onion, Some padding also has to be added to
the onion, so that it has a constant size, otherwise the size of the onion would
reveal the distance in number of hops from the sender to the recipient. The
privacy of the sender and the receiver of a message relies on the fact that there
should be no correspondence between incoming and outgoing messages from
a node. In practice an external passive global adversary could just track the
flow of messages through the network. To prevent this, an addition of dummy
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traffic and different mixing strategies are applied as extra measures beside the
routing protocol.
Most proposed anonymous ad hoc routing protocols, e.g. ANODR [KH03]
and ARM [SP06], are on demand routing protocols that use onions in some way
or another. The main idea of these protocols is that the source node Ns that is
to send a message to the recipient node Nr, broadcasts a route request message
that contains some information that only the recipient node can recognize
(typically some information encrypted with a shared key between Ns and Nr).
When nodes that are on the route, but not the recipient receives this route
request they either keep some state information of this route request, or they
add some encrypted information to the route request, so that later when the
recipient node broadcasts the route reply message they know how to process
and forward this message. When the source node Ns receives the route reply
from Nr it can start to send data messages along the established route.
4.2 The ANODR Protocol
The route discovery part of ANODR uses a variant of onion routing where
the source node broadcasts a route request message containing the inner core
of an onion, as the route reply is forwarded throughout the network each node
on the route adds a layer to this onion so that when the request reaches the
recipient node the onion is wrapped with layers of encryption of all the inter-
mediate nodes on the route. When the route reply is sent from the recipient
node it contains this onion, and as the route reply traverses the route back to
the source every node on the route peels off one layer of encryption from the
onion. The onion is padded with random bits so that its size does not reveal
the number of hops from the source or recipient node, but as noted by the
authors of [ZWK+04], this padding only protects against external adversaries.
An internal adversary controlling one of the nodes on the route will see the
size of the onion and can from this knowledge deduce the number of hops away
the message was originated.
When measuring the anonymity offered by the ANODR protocol in terms of
the conditional entropy, assuming one compromised network node, and given
the adversary’s a priori knowledge P0, the term P (yk|xi) in Equation 4 is equal
to 1 if the node Ni is k hops away from the adversarial node receiving the
message m, and equal to 0 otherwise. This means that we are simply reducing
the anonymity set to the nodes k hops away and scaling the probabilities
according to the a priori probability distribution.
If more than one node is compromised we need to exclude a number of nodes
from the anonymity set according to the network proportion of adversarial
nodes. One way of doing this when the a priori distribution is not uniform is to
weight the sending probability of each node in the anonymity set according to
the proportion of adversarial nodes as well as the a priori sending probability.
If the adversary controls c out of N network nodes we would then get the
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conditional entropy measure:
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
k
qk
∑
i
(1− c
N
)P (xi|yk) log2((1−
c
N
)P (xi|yk)). (5)
4.3 The ARM Protocol
The ARM protocol uses a probabilistic padding of onions and a probabilistic
time-to-live scheme in the route discovery part of the protocol.
The length of route request messages grows as they traverse the network,
so in order to prevent the disclosure of the distance the message has travelled,
the source node Ns randomly selects a padding length of the route request
message according to a specific probability distribution. This means that a
neighbor node of Ns can calculate the probability that Ns was the originator of
this route request message. For the route reply and data messages every node
on the route chooses a time-to-live value according to a specific probability
distribution, similarly in this case a neighbor node can calculate the probability
that this message originated from the broadcasting node.
Corresponding route request and route reply messages carry the same
pseudonym identifier, this allows an adversary to correlate the internal
information about these particular messages in a probabilistic attack with an
increasing number of malicious nodes as described in our adversary model.
If we only look at the route request messages, assume the padding length is
drawn from the discrete probability distribution R, where rl is the probability
that the padding length lmin ≤ l ≤ lmax is chosen. A padding length of l
means that the route request appears to a neighboring node of Ns to have
been originated l hops from the real source node.
In our measurement model this would mean that if a node observes that
according to the onion length the message was generated k hops away, the
message could have been originated at a node as far as k + lmax hops away.
The probability P (yk|xi) in Equation 4 would then be equal to rl if the node
Ni is k+ l hops away. The anonymity set for the possible sender nodes would
also increase in size giving:
ck = (1/2)ρ
k+lmax∑
i=k
(2i− 1)
So for the ARM protocol we are reducing the anonymity set to all nodes
between k and k + lmax hops away, and scaling the probabilities according
to the a priori probability distribution as well as the probability distribution
for the padding scheme. We can now analyze the anonymity in terms of
the conditional entropy for different numbers of adversarial nodes by using
Equation 5 as explained above. As an illustration of the anonymity measure
we have in Figure 1 plotted the conditional entropy measure as a function of
the proportion of adversary nodes for the ANODR and ARM protocols. In our
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Figure 1. Illustration of the conditional entropy measure applied to the ANODR and ARM
protocols
calculations we used the parameters ρ = 8, λ = 6 and lmax = 3, for simplicity
we assumed that the distributions P0 and R were uniform.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
We have proposed a probabilistic system model for anonymous ad hoc rout-
ing protocols and showed how the information theoretical measure conditional
entropy could be used for quantification of the average anonymity of the sys-
tem as the adversary captures an increasing number of nodes in the network.
We illustrated our approach by the examples of the ANODR and the ARM
protocol, but the approach could be generally applied to ad hoc routing pro-
tocols that are using probabilistic mechanisms to achieve anonymity.
It should be noted that the weakness of the padding of onions in the ANODR
protocol, allowing for an internal node to deduce the number of hops from
source node, was fixed in an updated version of the protocol. To achieve
secure onion routing the padding of onions should be done in such a way that
a node receiving a padded onion is unable to tell if it was padded or not, the
cryptographic issues involved in such a padding scheme were treated formally
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by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL05]. However, in an ad hoc routing setting
we need to be concerned about the efficiency of computations, so there is
always a trade-off between the security and usability of a protocol, which
sometimes rules out the use of provable secure but computationally heavy
solutions.
There are many possible directions for further research based on this ap-
proach. When designers of a protocol want to achieve a statistical notion of
anonymity, meaning that the probability of determining the sender or recipient
of a message should not exceed a certain threshold, as described by [KEB98]
and [THV04], our approach could possibly be used in an analysis for max-
imising anonymity while minimising the computational cost. We proposed
an analytical model for calculating anonymity in terms of entropy, giving a
weighted average entropy measure. We used a simple network topology model
for our calculations, to further improve the measurement model we could in
our future work replace the topology model with simulations of many different
network topologies and routes, with a varying number of adversarial nodes.
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Abstract In open multiagent systems, agents are owned by a variety of stakeholders
and can enter and leave the system at any time. Therefore, trust is a fun-
damental concern in effective interactions which is a key component of such
systems. In this paper, we propose a trust model for autonomous agents in
mulitagent environments based on hidden Markov models and reinforcement
learning. By this combination, the reliability of the hidden Markov model will
be improved since its parameters are re-estimated after training of the model
with the reinforcement learning module.
1. Introduction
The rapidly changing environments of the Internet suffer from problems
related to fragile trustworthiness of its millions of active entities, which can
be humans or mobile agents. This problem is nontrivial, as more and more
commercial transactions get carried out over the Internet. Therefore, devis-
ing an effective approach for verification of trustworthiness in such complex
environments is essential, since trust mechanisms play a key role in the se-
curity of the entities. Also the trust establishment is nontrivial, since the
traditional and social means of trust cannot be applied directly to the virtual
settings of these environments, because in many cases the involved parties did
not have any previous interaction. In such scenarios, trust management tech-
niques may be used to stimulate service quality and acceptable user behavior
in online markets and communities, and also sanction possible unacceptable
user behavior.
Application of autonomous agents in large-scale open distributed systems
presents a number of new challenges such as:
Agents with different characteristics can enter the system and interact
with one another.
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Each agent tries to maximize its individual utility because it represents
a specific stakeholder with various objectives.
Agents may change their identities on re-entering the system to avoid
punishment for any past wrong doing.
Agents should decide how, when, and with whom to interact without any
guarantees that the interaction will actually achieve the desired benefits.
Agents are faced with significant degrees of uncertainty in making decisions
since it is impossible to obtain perfect information about the environment and
the interaction partners properties. In such circumstances, agents have to
establish appropriate trust in each other in order to minimize the impact of
the uncertainty associated with interactions [RHJ05].
The goal of an agent in a dynamic environment is to make optimal trust
decisions over time. Learning trust serves such a purpose by biasing the agent’s
action choices through information gathered over time. An agent can base its
action choice on prediction of the other agents’ behaviors or directly on the
reward (the outcome of the interaction) received from them. Reinforcement
learning is a systematic method that associates an agent’s action with its
rewards.
In reinforcement learning, an agent need not explicitly model other agents
since its action can be directly based on the rewards. Thus this learning
method is particularly useful for cases where agents have little knowledge
about each other. An agent in a multiagent system may know little about
others because information is distributed. Even when an agent has some prior
information about others, the behavior of others may change over time. It is
therefore natural to apply a learning algorithm.
Our model consists of trust estimation and trust learning modules. The for-
mer and latter are constructed from Hidden Markov Models (HMM) and Re-
inforcement Learning (RL), respectively. The model parameters of the HMM
are re-estimated after having learnt about its environment from the reinforce-
ment learning module. The proposed method enables us to improve the model
reliability when dealing with a dynamic environment that changes over time.
2. Related Work
In [HCD05] a trust model using a Markov model is proposed. In this work
the Markov chain is defined as the chain of aggregated reputation values cor-
responding to a sequence of consecutive time slots. The current state vector
shows the repute value of the reputation queried at time slot N .The Markov
matrix of a given agent denotes the probability of that agent transiting from
one trustworthiness level to another trustworthiness level based on its past
behavior captured using the Markov chain. In order to determine the prob-
ability of an agent transiting from trustworthiness level A to trustworthiness
level B, based on the Markov chain, they use the ratio of the number of times
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that agent has transited from trustworthiness level A to trustworthiness level
B to that of the total number of time that the agent has transited from trust-
worthiness level A to any other trustworthiness level. The future state vector
of the agent is determined by multiplying the current state vector with the
Markov matrix. The same authors also proposed a method for determining the
effectiveness of their Markov model for predicting the future trustworthiness
value of a given agent by utilizing simulation methods [HCD06]. This paper
presents the simulation method that they employed in order to determine the
effectiveness of the Markov model in detail.
In [SKN06], the authors compare the effectiveness of probabilistic computa-
tional trust systems. They conclude that most probabilistic trust models are
unrealistic, as the models allows for no dynamic behavior, and outline the idea
of a trust model based on a hidden Markov model to cope with this problem.
In [SPX04], the authors have developed a hidden Markov model based ap-
proach to measuring an agent’s reputation as a recommender. This approach
models chained recommendation events as an HMM. The features of the trust
model are: (1) no explicit requirement of chained recommendation reputa-
tions; (2) flexible recommendation network with presence of loops; and (3)
integration of learning speed into trust evaluation reliability. In [NTH+06] an
architecture for trust management in ubiquitous environments that deals with
digital signatures and user presence in a uniform framework is proposed. This
architecture includes inferences about user presence from incomplete sensor
signals based on an HMM.
3. The Proposed Model
Our model consists of trust estimation and trust learning modules con-
structed from Hidden Markov Models (HMM) and Reinforcement Learning
(RL) as depicted in Figure 1. The model parameters of the HMM are re-
estimated after having learnt about its environment from the reinforcement
learning module. The proposed method enables us to improve the model re-
liability when dealing with a dynamic environment that changes over time.
Similar approaches combining reinforcement learning and HMMs applied to
motion recognition can be found in [HYU02] and [HMN04].
In the following sections we will start with describing some assumptions
and limitations of this work, thereafter we present the stochastic modeling
approach and details of the hidden Markov modeling.
3.1 Model States
An agent can be in a trusted, neutral or untrusted state at any given time.
An agent is in an untrusted state if it has been behaving in a malicious way
in previous interactions, it is in a trusted state if it has shown good behavior.
If its behavior has been a mixture of good and bad, or if it has not yet given
any signs of its behavior, it is in the neutral state.
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Figure 1. Architecture of the proposed trust model
When an agent joins the system it is most likely in a neutral state, but
there is also a small probability that it is in the untrusted state. Since it has
not yet interacted with any of the other agents, no positive observations of its
behavior have been made, so it can not be in a trusted state.
After joining the system the agent has a probability of becoming trusted
or untrusted as it is interacting with other agents, depending on its behavior.
We model trust as a dynamic variable, changing with time. This allow us to
capture the behavioral characteristics of agents that are behaving good for a
certain time, but then suddenly start misbehaving.
3.2 Modeling of Agent Trustworthiness
In this section we will present an HMM for the trust relationship of agents
in a multiagent system.
We model the agent interaction as a stochastic process. This means that we
assume that there is a random time interval between each agent interaction
and that the behavior of an agent is only dependent on the current state of
the agent. The state of an agent can be characterized by whether or not it is
behaving in a malicious manner in its interactions with other agents. When
using a continuous time Markov model to model the state of an agent, we
make the following assumptions; all information about the agent is contained
in the state, observations are independent given the current state, and state
occupation time is negatively exponentially distributed.
When agents are interacting, an agent makes its opinion about the trust-
worthiness of the other agent based on the outcome of the interaction. After
a random time interval these two agents meet again, and based on their belief
about the other agent’s trustworthiness they may decide whether or not to
make an interaction. Since an agent’s behavior can be changing with time it
is not necessarily the case that an agent is in the same state as it were at the
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last encounter. An agent can only do its best guessing about the trustworthi-
ness state of an other agent based on its own previous direct experiences with
said agent and recommendations from other agents in the system. This means
that the system state is hidden, and hence we use the HMM approach.
The system we consider is a multiagent system and we want to use the
model to estimate the behavior of each single agent. An agent in the system
rates all of the other agents after an interaction and uses an HMM per agent
to decide and predict whether or not another agent is malicious. The HMM
is updated from observations, that is the ratings after direct experiences or
recommendations requested from other agents.
An HMM consists of a finite set of N hidden states S = {s1, . . . , sN} with
an associated probability distribution. The state of the monitored agent is
described by a discrete time Markov chain xk = x1, x2, . . . where xk ∈ S
is the possibly hidden state of the node at sampling instant k. Pk = {pkij}
is the set of state transition probabilities, pkij = P (xk+1 = sj | xk = si),
1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , where xk is the current state of the system. pi = {pii} is
the initial state distribution, where pii = P (x1 = si), 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The
output from the agent ratings is classified by the set of observation symbols
V = {v1, . . . , vM}. Let yk = y1, y2 . . . denote the sequence of observations,
where yk ∈ V is the observation made at sampling instant k. The HMM
consists of two stochastic processes; the hidden process xk, and the observable
process yk that depends on xk. The relation between xk and yk is described
by the probability distribution matrix B = {bj(m)}, where bj(m) = P (yk =
vm | xk = sj), for 1 ≤ j ≤ N , 1 ≤ m ≤ M . See for instance [Rab90] for a
more extensive introduction to HMMs.
In our model we define three states, that can be characterized by the
behavior of the agent, thus N = 3 and each individual state is denoted
S = {s1, s2, s3}. The first state is the trusted state s1, where the agent is
not showing any malicious behavior, the second state is the neutral state s2,
where the outcome of interactions can be ambiguous, the third state is the
untrusted state s3 where the agent is showing malicious behavior.
We have not made any assumptions about time between observations, and
there is no direct relation between observations and state-changes. As a con-
sequence the system could have made zero, one or more transitions during the
time between to successive observations.
The time when observation number k is produced is denoted tk. Time
between observation k − 1 and observation k is denoted δk = tk − tk−1.
3.3 State Probability Distribution
The transition rate matrix Λ = (λij) is describing the dynamics of the
system. To simplify the notation of equations and algorithms we will use
i and j instead of si and sj . The relation between system states and the
transition rates is given by
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λij =
limdt→0
P (x(t+ dt) = j|x(t) = i)
dt
if i '= j∑N
j %=i,j=1−λij if i = j
. (1)
Since observations are received at irregular intervals, the running transition
probabilities pkij = P (x(t + δk) = j|x(t) = i) depend on the time since last
observation δk, and have to be calculated each time an observation is received.
The running transition probability matrix Pk = (pkij) can be derived from
Kolmogorov’s equations [Ros03] as follows
Pk = eΛδk . (2)
For large state spaces this calculation can be quite expensive, but in our case
the state space is small, and the calculations inexpensive. Let γk = (γk(i))
denote the state probability distribution at time tk given all observations re-
ceived until time tk, γk(i) = P (xk = i|yk) where yk = y1, . . . , yk. We will
use ten observation symbols V = {v1, v2, . . . , v10}, where the first five symbols
are the ratings an agent make after a direct interaction and the last five sym-
bols are ratings received as recommendations from other agents. The ratings
are given in the form of trustworthiness values ranging from 1 to 5, where 1
corresponds to “very trustworthy”, 2 to “trustworthy”, 3 to “moderate”, 4 to
“untrustworthy”, and 5 to “very untrustworthy”. Algorithm 4 is used to up-
date the current state distribution γk−1, based on the following inputs: k the
observation index, γ = γk−1 the current state distribution, y = yk the current
observation, and δ = δk the time between the current observation and last
observation. In addition to the dynamic variables listed above, the following
parameters are assumed to be available for the algorithm: the transition rates
Λ, the initial state distribution pi , and the two observation probability ma-
trices Bψ, where B1 is used for the direct observations v1, . . . , v5, and B2 is
used for the implicit observations in the form of recommendations v6, . . . , v10.
Algorithm 4 was originally proposed in [HMK08], it is based on dynamic
programming and uses a set of temporary variables. During the processing
of observation yk the value stored in α(i) represents the following probability
α(i) = P (yk, xk = si), also known as the forward variable. By using dy-
namic programming in the estimation of γ, the complexity of an update is
reduced from O(2kNk) for a straight forward calculation, to O(N2). Scaling
of the α(i) is used in order to prevent problems related to underflow, for more
details see the forward-backward procedure described in [Rab90]. It should
be noted that Algorithm 4 is an on-line algorithm and very efficient, it does
not require the agents to keep any history of past observations in memory.
The history of observations and the values of some of the running variables
are, however, required for the more computationally expensive re-estimation
of model parameters as explained later.
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Algorithm 4 Update state probability distribution
Require: k,ψ, γ, y, δ
Pk ← eΛδ
B ← Bψ
if k = 1 then
for i = 1 to N do
α(i)← bi(y)pii
γ(i)← bi(y)piiPN
j=1 bj(y)pij
end for
else
for i = 1 to N do
α(i)← bi(y)
∑N
j=1 γ(j)p
k
ji
end for
for i = 1 to N do
γ(i)← α(i)PN
j=1 α(j)
end for
end if
return γ
4. Learning of Model Parameters
The parameters of an HMM are usually set by oﬄine training of the model
with a large data set. Since we want the model to reflect the more realis-
tic dynamic behavior of the multiagent system and also optimize the agents’
trust-related behavior, we will use an online learning of the HMM parameters
with reinforcement learning. Reinforcement learning (RL) [SB98] is a machine
learning technique for solving decision problems of mapping actions to states
based on interactions with the environment. The actions of an agent in the
multiagent system could for instance be whether or not it should interact with
another agent, based on its belief about the state of the other agent derived
from the HMM. Such a mapping from state to action is called a policy. In RL
the agents will learn policies based on feedback from the environment that is
calculated based on a reward function.
A simple reward function for the multiagent trust model can be defined as
follows:
1 If an interaction was made, and the agent’s rating of the other agent’s
behavior was given the values 1, 2 or 3, a positive reward is given.
2 If an interaction was made, and the agent’s rating of the other agent’s
behavior was given the values 4 or 5, a negative reward is given.
3 If no interaction was made, a zero reward is given.
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The RL framework also includes a value function Q(s, a) which estimates
the reward obtained if action a is performed in state s.
Q-learning [WD92] is a well-known RL algorithm that updates the value
function in each step so that the agent policy converges to the optimal one.
Q-learning works even though the state transition probabilities are unknown
to the agent. In our approach we will use the output of the Q-learning to
improve the HMM by updating the state transition rate matrix according to
the learned optimal policy.
Since the current state of an agent is hidden in our trust model, we will
instead use the state probability distribution γ that is calculated after each
observation, and learn the function Q(γ, a). A variant of the Q-learning algo-
rithm suitable for this case where the current state is only partially observable,
and accounting for the fact that the domain of Q is not discrete and finite,
can be found in [Chr92]. Following this approach we associate a value q(i, a)
with each hidden state si, and approximate Q(γ, a) as
Q(γ, a) ≈
N∑
i=1
γ(i)q(i, a).
Learning Q is done by adjusting all the q values after each action a and
immediate reward r according to the Q-learning rule:
q(i, a) = (1− ηγk(i))q(i, a) + ηγk(i)(r + σmax
a
Q(γk+1, a)), (3)
where η is the learning rate and σ is a discount factor. The learning proceeds
as follows, when an agent encounters another agent it will get the current
state probability distribution γk belonging to this particular agent from its
corresponding HMM and execute the action with the largest Q(γk, a). After
the action is performed, the agent receives the reward, the next step state
probability distribution γk+1 is output from the HMM, and the Q-learning
updating rule from Equation 3 is applied. The process is repeated at the next
encounter between the agents. It should be noted that the observations to
the HMM coming from recommendations will not result in actions or rewards,
only the direct experiences in the form of agent interaction will trigger the
reinforcement learning module in the trust model.
When the agent encounters another agent for the first time, the parameters
of the HMM will be set to default values, and the model might not properly
predict the system dynamics. A newcomer to the system should not be ex-
pected to be in the trusted state, as such a starting point would encourage
agents to change their identities and re-enter the system frequently. It is there-
fore better to assume that agents are most likely neutral or untrustworthy to
start with, and then they have to prove themselves trustworthy by behaving
good in the interactions.
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As the agent learns about the behavior of the other agent through direct
experience and recommendations, the HMM parameters should be updated
in order to improve the predictiveness of the model. We suggest that the
state transition rates Λ and the observation probabilities B of the HMM are
updated after a predetermined number of Q-learning steps, e.g. by the Baum-
Welch algorithm which finds the maximum likelihood parameter estimate. See
[Rab90] for a detailed explanation of the Baum-Welch algorithm.
Given a sequence of K observations the Baum-Welch algorithm makes
use of the backward variable βk(i) = P (yk+1, . . . , yK |xk = si), which is the
probability of the observation sequence from next step and until the end
given that we are in the state si at time-step k. The backward variable
is found inductively by setting βK(i) = 1 and then recursively calculating
βk(i) =
∑N
j=1 pijbj(yk+1)βk+1(j). The re-estimation procedure calculates the
joint probability ξ(i, j) = P (xk = si, xk+1 = sj |y) of being in state si at
time-step k and state sj in time-step k + 1 as
ξ(i, j) =
αk(i)pijbj(yk+1)βk+1(j)∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 αk(i)pijbj(yk+1βk+1(j))
.
For re-estimation of pij according to Baum-Welch we use
pij =
∑K−1
k=1 ξ(i, j)∑K−1
k=1 γk(i)
,
where the nominator is the expected number of transitions from state si to
state sj , and the denominator is the expected number of transitions from state
si. For re-estimation of the observation symbol probabilities the following
equation is used
bj(m) =
∑K
k=1,s.t.yk=vm
γk(j)∑K
k=1 γk(j)
,
where the nominator is the expected number of times in state sj and observing
the symbol vm and the denominator is the expected number of times in state
sj .
Algorithm 5 implements the re-estimation of the parameters. In order to
avoid problems related to underflow we use scaling of the backward variable
as described in [Rab90] and [Rah00]. The proof of correctness of the scaling
procedure is given in the Appendix A. Algorithm 5 takes as input all the K
different αk and γk vectors, which are calculated by Algorithm 4, as well as all
the different Pk. This means that these values need to be stored in the agent’s
memory together with the history of observations for the re-estimation pro-
cedure. To simplify the implementation we will combine the two observation
probability matrices into one single matrix B for the re-estimation algorithm.
The observation probabilities are modeling the uncertainties associated with
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Algorithm 5 Re-estimation of parameters
Require: P ,γ,y,α,B,K
for i = 1 to N do
βˆK(i)← 1PN
i=1 αK(i)
end for
for k = K − 1 to 1 do
for i = 1 to N do
βˆk(i)← 1PN
j=1 αk(j)
∑N
j=1 p
k
ijbj(yk+1)βˆk+1(j)
for j = 1 to N do
ξk(i, j)← γk(i)pkijbj(yk+1)βˆk+1(j)
end for
γˆk(i)←
∑N
j=1 ξ
k(i, j)
end for
end for
for i = 1 to N do
for j = 1 to N do
pij ←
PK−1
k=1 ξ
k(i,j)PK−1
k=1 γˆk(i)
end for
end for
for m = 1 to M do
for j = 1 to N do
bj(m)←
PK
k=1,s.t.yk=vm
γˆk(j)PK
k=1 γˆk(j)
end for
end for
return B,P
observations. This means that when we re-estimate bj(m) elements associated
with the direct observations, i. e. the agent’s own ratings after interactions,
we are evaluating the reliability of the agent itself when it comes to making
good trust decisions. The elements associated with the recommendations are
re-estimated as an evaluation of the reliability of the recommending agents.
In this context we do not model the trustworthiness of each recommender
separately, but this could be done as an extension of the model.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
We have proposed a novel trust model for multiagent systems where the
goal of an agent is to make optimal trust decisions over time in a dynamic
environment. An agent bases its action choice on a prediction of the other
agents’ behaviors according to the HMM trust estimation module following
the Q-learning greedy policy. Since this is a policy that tends to the optimal
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one over time, the model learning algorithm will be training the HMM with
sequences of observations that will positively impact the end goal.
As this is just a preliminary theoretical model, without any simulation re-
sults yet, there are many directions of research that may be explored to im-
prove our work. We would like to see if it is possible to additionally train
the model to making the best decisions about when to ask other agents for
recommendations. Application of the model to a variety of trust scenarios and
a comparison to other proposed trust models is of course the prime interest of
our future work.
Appendix: Scaling of the forward and backward variables
We want to use scaling of the forward variable and the backward variable, to avoid prob-
lems related to underflow. Since, without scaling, these variables consist of a large number of
terms of value significantly less than 1. This appendix will give a detailed explanation of the
scaling procedure for the implementation of the Algorithms 4 and 5, as proposed in [Rab90]
and [Rah00]. We have that
αk(i) =
(
piibi(yk) if k = 1
bi(yk)
PN
j=1 αk−1(j)pji if k > 1
(A.1)
where αk(i) is the forward variable without any scaling. We want to compute the scaled
forward variable
αˆk(i) = Ckαk(i), (A.2)
with scaling coefficient
Ck =
1PN
j=1 αk(j)
. (A.3)
Let us use the notation α¯k(i) for the running value of the forward variable as it is used in
the implementation before scaling, and ck for the running value of the scaling coefficient.
The recursion for calculating the scaled forward variable can then be expressed as:
Initialization:
α¯1(i) = α1(i)
αˆ1(i) =
α1(i)PN
j=1 α1(j)
For k > 1:
α¯k(i) = bi(yk)
NX
j=1
αˆk−1(j)pji
ck =
1PN
j=1 α¯k(j)
αˆk(i) = ckα¯k(i)
We want to prove that this recursion realizes the scaling as expressed in Equation A.2. For
k = 1 the scaling coefficient is c1 = C1 = 1PN
j=1 α1(j)
, so the scaling is exactly as in Equation
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A.2. For k > 1 we can use a proof of induction as follows:
α¯k(i) = bi(yk)
NX
j=1
αˆk−1(j)pji
= bi(yk)
NX
j=1
Ck−1αk−1(j)pji (by application of Equation A.2)
= Ck−1αk(i) (by application of Equation A.1)
This gives us the relation
ck =
1PN
j=1 α¯k(j)
=
1
Ck−1
PN
j=1 αk(j)
(A.4)
We can then express αˆk(i) as
αˆk(i) = ckα¯k(i) =
Ck−1αk(i)
Ck−1
PN
j=1 αk(j)
=
αk(i)PN
j=1 αk(j)
so the recursion used is indeed realizing the scaling as given in Equation A.2, which was
what we wanted to show. Furthermore, by combining Equations A.3 and A.4, we get the
relation
Ck = Ck−1ck =
kY
κ=1
cκ
Recall the definition of the backward variable:
βk(i) =
(
1 if k = K
bi(yk+1)
PN
j=1 βk+1(j)pij if k > K
For the scaling of the backward variable let us define the scaling coefficient
Dk =
KY
κ=k
cκ
which gives us the relation
CkDk+1 =
kY
κ=1
cκ
KY
κ=k+1
cκ = CK
Let us denote by βˆk(i), the scaled backward variable
βˆk(i) = Dkβk(i) (A.5)
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and let us denote by β¯k(i), the running backward variable as it is used in the implementation
before scaling. The recursion for calculating the scaled backward variable is given by
Initialization:
β¯K(i) = βK(i) = 1
βˆK(i) = DK = cK
for k < K:
β¯k(i) = bi(yk+1)
NX
j=1
βˆk+1(j)pij
βˆk(i) = ckβ¯k(i)
Note that the running value of the scaling coefficient will be the same ck as was used in
the scaling of the forward variable. For k = K the Equation A.5 is trivially fulfilled. The
correctness of the recursion for k < K can be shown by induction as follows
β¯k(i) = bi(yk+1)
NX
j=1
βˆk+1(j)pij
= bi(yk+1)
NX
j=1
Dk+1βk+1(j)pij
= Dk+1βk(i)
we can then rewrite βˆk(i) as
βˆk(i) = ckβ¯k(i) = ckDk+1βk(i) = Dkβk(i)
hence, the recursion is realizing the scaling in Equation A.5.
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Abstract Computational trust and reputation models are used to aid the decision-making
process in complex dynamic environments, where we are unable to obtain per-
fect information about the interaction partners. In this paper we present a
comparison of our proposed hidden Markov trust model to the Beta reputation
system. The hidden Markov trust model takes the time between observations
into account, it also distinguishes between system states and uses methods pre-
viously applied to intrusion detection for the prediction of which state an agent
is in. We show that the hidden Markov trust model performs better when it
comes to the detection of changes in behavior of agents, due to its larger rich-
ness in model features. This means that our trust model may be more realistic
in dynamic environments. However, the increased model complexity also leads
to bigger challenges in estimating parameter values for the model. We also
show that the hidden Markov trust model can be parameterized so that it
responds similarly to the Beta reputation system.
1. Introduction
Trust is a fundamental part of social and commercial relationships, both in
the real-life and the virtual world. Complex dynamic environments, like the
Internet, makes it extremely hard to obtain perfect information about poten-
tial interaction partners. In e-commerce and other electronic transactions and
services, where the assets of interaction partners might be at risk, trust mech-
anisms may facilitate the decision-making process and lower the risk. Since
trust management can be assumed to decrease risk, it can also be assumed
that it will increase security and can be considered as a soft security mecha-
nism [RJ96]. Soft security accepts the fact that it is possible to circumvent
the implemented security mechanisms, given enough time, effort and money.
Since we might have users with malicious intentions in a system, the challenge
is to detect them and find a way to monitor their behavior and possibly in-
fluence their actions, in order to prevent them from causing any harm. Trust
management serves this purpose by evaluating the trustworthiness of users and
offering different service levels to users based on a trust policy. If services are
denied to untrusted users, an incentive for users not to misbehave, is created.
Computational trust and reputation models seek to quantify trust as a value
derived from previous direct experiences and/or second-hand information,
such as recommendations, and suggest mathematical and logical expressions
for how to combine several opinions about trustworthiness into reputation val-
ues. Such models are clearly needed in the virtual world where non-human
agents are making trust-based decisions. But also when the human end-user
is making the decisions, such calculated trust values can be very useful as de-
cision support. For this reason a number of different trust models have been
proposed. The modeling complexity varies, ranging from very simple eBay-
like models to more sophisticated models based on probability theory, e.g. the
Bayesian trust and reputation models [MMH02, JI02, BLB04, NKS07, JH07].
In this paper we will present a comparison of our previously proposed hidden
Markov trust model [MTK08] to a binomial Bayesian reputation system [JI02].
The comparison is done with the help of simulations of trust scenarios. The
objectives of this paper is to discuss probabilistic measurement of trust, out-
line the models and compare their performance in a dynamic environment
where the (un)trusted objects may change behavior. We show that the hidden
Markov trust model performs better when it comes to the detection of changes
in behavior of agents, this means that our trust model may be more realistic
for dynamic environments. We also show that the hidden Markov trust model
can be parameterized so that it responds similarly to the Bayesian reputation
system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
challenges related to modeling dynamic trust and how the different models can
be evaluated. Section 3 gives a brief introduction to Bayesian trust models, in
particular the Beta reputation system, Section 4 discusses the hidden Markov
trust model, the simulation results are presented in Section 5, and Section 6
discusses the simulation results and concludes the paper.
2. The Dynamic Trust Modeling Problem
Since trust and reputation are active fields of ongoing research, numerous
different models for quantification and evaluation of trust have been proposed.
A review on some of these computational trust models can be found in [SS05].
However, there seems to be no single agreed upon model that can be used for
benchmarking and comparison of the different trust and reputation algorithms.
Reputation models used for electronic commerce are often based on very
simple mathematical formulas for combining opinions. One example is the
reputation system implemented in eBay, where a feedback score is calculated
as a sum of ratings that can be either positive, corresponding to a value of
+1, negative with a value −1, or neutral with 0 value. A survey of trust and
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Figure 1. The architecture of a reputation system using hidden Markov trust modeling
reputation systems that are currently used in online services can be found
in [JIB07].
In [DFM01], several desirable qualities of reputation systems are listed. Ac-
cording to the authors a reputation system should be efficient, robust against
attacks, easily understandable and verifiable. It should also be weighted toward
current behavior, meaning that it responds quickly to changes in behavior so
that an entity which has performed well consistently over a long time but then
suddenly changes its behavior will be detected and maybe no longer trusted.
This feature is missing in many trust and reputation models as trust is modeled
as a static property, not taking the time component into consideration. For
some applications of reputation and trust the time dependency and response
to dynamic behavior are very important, as the behavior of agents could be as-
sumed to be highly dynamic. One example of such an application is when trust
metrics are used in ad hoc routing protocols to counter malicious nodes, see
for instance [MGLB00, DDB04, BLB04, BVTL07]. The common approach
is that every node in the network monitors its neighbors and measures the
frequency of packet dropping, misrouting and other potentially malicious be-
havior, and keeps a trustworthiness rating or reputation value recorded for all
other nodes based on these observations. The underlying routing protocol is
then modified with a trust component which selects routing paths and makes
routing decisions based on the reputation values.
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The computational trust algorithm used to calculate the reputation value
varies. In [DDB04], a simple eBay-like scheme is used, where reputation is
a sum of recommendations of +1 whenever a packet reaches its destination,
and −1 if a packet is dropped, a node is considered untrusted if its reputa-
tion value falls below a certain threshold. In [BLB04] a more sophisticated
scheme, based on a Bayesian reputation system, is used. A trust-based ad
hoc routing protocol based on hidden Markov modeling of trust was proposed
by the authors in [MHK08]. The architecture of the trust component used in
this approach, presented as a more general decentralized reputation system, is
illustrated in Figure 1. Every agent in the system keeps and updates hidden
Markov models (HMMs), that are modeling the trust state of all the other
agents. Before an agent (trustor) initiates an interaction with another agent
(trustee), it looks up the trustworthiness value derived from the HMM belong-
ing to the trustee. The trustor then decides according to a policy whether or
not to interact with the trustee. After an interaction, the HMM belonging to
the trustee is updated with a rating, good g, or bad b, based on the outcome
of the interaction. The HMMs are also updated with observations in the form
of ratings from other agents in the system, so called second-hand opinions,
which are either in the form of recommendations r, or warnings w. In this
study we do not include trust transitivity between different contexts, for the
simplicity of the comparison, so we assume that the HMMs are only updated
with observations related to the same context. We also do not consider chains
of recommendations.
With this paper we would like to compare our hidden Markov modeling of
trust to the Bayesian approach, in particular with regard to performance of
the modeling of the dynamic aspect of trust, since this is a very important
feature for applications in dynamic networking environments. A quantitative
approach to comparing trust models can be found in [NKS07]. In this paper
it is proposed to use the information theoretical measure relative entropy.
However, this approach is only applicable to probabilistic trust models that
share the same fundamental assumptions about the underlying probability
distributions. In cases where a direct mathematical comparison of models is
difficult, comparison by the help of simulations seems to be the most viable
approach. Different trust scenarios can be simulated in order to see which
trust and reputation system performs best with regard to reliability of the
calculated values under various hostile agent strategies.
3. Bayesian Trust Modeling
Bayesian trust models, for calculating reputation scores from ratings, are
based on the assumption that the behavior of an agent can be described accord-
ing to a probability distribution. The trust value is a function of the expected
value of the probability distribution, which gets updated with every new rating
received according to Bayes’ Theorem. Binomial Bayesian reputation systems,
where ratings can be expressed by two values, good or bad, are modeled with
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the Beta probability density function [MMH02, JI02, BLB04]. Multinomial
Bayesian reputation systems, that allow for ratings with graded levels, are
modeled with the Dirichlet probability density function [NKS07, JH07]. In
this paper we will focus on the binomial case, and evaluate the performance of
our proposed trust model compared to the Beta reputation system proposed
by Jøsang et al. [JI02].
3.1 The Beta Reputation System
The Beta reputation system models the reputation formation for a trustor
as a sequence of observations, where each observation is the outcome of the
rating done by a trustee, based on the outcome of an interaction. A reputation
centre collects ratings from all the agents, and updates each agent’s reputation
score.
The underlying mathematical model of the Beta reputation system considers
the ratings as a sequence of trials with binomial outcomes, for each trial there
is a probability p of getting a good rating (recommendation) and a probability
(1 − p) of getting a bad rating (warning). The parameter p belonging to a
trustor is initially unknown, so due to lack of information it is assumed that
it is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. As ratings concerning this
trustor start to arrive, there is more information available and we can update
the distribution of p. In accordance with Bayesian inference we have a prior
hypothesis X about the outcome of a trial, which is updated a posteriori to
the actual outcome Y in accordance with Bayes’ Theorem
P (X | Y ) = P (X)P (Y | X)
P (Y )
. (1)
The Beta distribution
Beta(α,β) =
Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
pα−1(1− p)β−1 (2)
is a conjugate prior for binomial trials (Bernoulli process). This means that if
we assume that the prior X hypothesis is described by Beta(α,β), and Y is a
sequence of ratings, out of which r is the number of good ratings (recommen-
dations) and w is the number of bad ratings (warnings), then the posterior
P (X | Y ) is also described by a Beta distribution Beta(α+ r,β+w). The ini-
tial prior is given by Beta(1, 1), which corresponds to the uniform distribution
on [0, 1]. The reputation value is given as a function of the expectation value
of the Beta distribution E(p) = α/(α + β), for the posterior hypothesis the
expectation is found by setting α = r+1 and β = w+1. This results in a very
simple calculation of the probability expectation value. Let (rk, wk) denote
the ratings received at iteration step k, we then get the following recursion for
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deriving the Beta parameters:
αk = αk−1 + rk, βk = βk−1 + wk, α0 = β0 = 1. (3)
For finding the probability expectation value at iteration step k we get:
E(pk) =
αk
αk + βk
. (4)
The probability expectation value given in Equation 4 gives a reputation rat-
ing in the range [0, 1], where the value 0.5 represents a neutral reputation
value. To make the reputation model more realistic, several modifications to
the calculation of the reputation value are introduced. These variations in-
clude discounting of ratings based on the reputation of the agent providing
the rating, forgetting old ratings by giving old ratings less weight than more
recent ratings, and weighting of ratings according to the value of the rated
transaction.
3.2 Evaluation of the Beta Model
The Beta reputation system without forgetting factor is efficient, easily un-
derstandable and verifiable, but it is not weighted toward current behavior.
This is due to the underlying Bayesian framework, which assumes that the
behavior of agents can be approximated by a fixed probability distribution.
Since agents may change behavior over time, this static modeling is not real-
istic. The forgetting factor 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 was introduced in [JI02] to overcome
this problem. It is used to scale the parameters (α,β) in every update of the
Beta distribution, so that the we get
α∗k = α
∗
k−1φ+ rk, β
∗
k = β
∗
k−1φ+ wk, α
∗
0 = β
∗
0 = 1. (5)
A forgetting factor φ = 1 means that all ratings are weighted equally, and
nothing is forgotten, with φ = 0 only the last rating is remembered. In
Figure 2 we can see how the Beta model responds to a sequence with 20 good
ratings followed by 20 bad ratings, with different forgetting factors.
As noted by the authors of [NKS07], the forgetting factor is a form of
exponential decay on the parameters of the Beta model giving an effective
bias towards newer information, but it is unclear if this fading mechanism
is really modeling dynamic behavior of the agents. If agents were likely to
change their behavior in such a way that the probability p of getting good
ratings slowly increases or decreases, this fading of parameters seems like a
good modeling approach. However, if we consider a disruptive agent that
follows a strategy where it behaves good for a certain amount of time, building
up a good reputation value, and then suddenly starts to misbehave taking
advantage of its reputation, this slowly adapting model might not be good
enough.
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Figure 2. The Beta model with different forgetting factors, the observations are 20 good
ratings followed by 20 bad ratings.
Another problem with the Beta model is the lack of time component. The
reputation formation is only depending on the number of ratings, without
taking the time between ratings into account. If we assume that ratings are
not received at regular intervals, the claim that the forgetting factor takes care
of adjusting the model towards new information may not be valid anymore.
A simple way of rectifying this is by introducing a time stamp on the ratings,
like suggested in [WJI04].
4. The Hidden Markov Trust Model
The hidden Markov trust model takes the time between observations into
account, it also distinguishes between system states and uses methods previ-
ously applied to intrusion prevention [HMK08] for the prediction of which state
an agent is in. The hidden Markov trust model was originally proposed by the
authors as a component in a trust-based ad hoc routing protocol [MHK08].
It was further developed with a parameter learning component for multiagent
environments [MTK08].
4.1 Hidden Markov Modeling
A hidden Markov model (HMM) consists of a finite set of N hidden states
S = {s1, . . . , sN} with an associated probability distribution. The state of the
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monitored agent is described by a discrete time Markov chain xk = x1, x2, . . .
where xk ∈ S is the possibly hidden state of the agent at sampling instant
k. Pk = {pkij} is the set of state transition probabilities, pkij = P (xk+1 = sj |
xk = si), 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , where xk is the current state of the system. pi = {pii}
is the initial state distribution, where pii = P (x1 = si), 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The
output from the agent ratings is classified by the set of observation symbols
V = {v1, . . . , vM}. Let yk = y1, y2 . . . denote the sequence of observations,
where yk ∈ V is the observation made at sampling instant k. The HMM
consists of two stochastic processes; the hidden process xk, and the observable
process yk that depends on xk. The relation between xk and yk is described
by the probability distribution matrix B = {bj(m)}, where bj(m) = P (yk =
vm | xk = sj), for 1 ≤ j ≤ N , 1 ≤ m ≤ M . See for instance [Rab90] for a
more extensive introduction to HMMs.
In the hidden Markov trust model considered in this paper, we choose
to use two hidden states {trusted, untrusted}, and four observation symbols
{g, b, r, w}, corresponding to the observations good, bad, recommendation and
warning. The reason for choosing two states is to make it easier to compare
the model with the binomial Bayesian model. A comparison of our model with
more states and more observation symbols to a multinomial Bayesian model
would be an interesting topic for our future work. An agent is in an untrusted
state if it has been behaving in a malicious way in previous interactions, it is
in a trusted state if it has shown good behavior. We model trust as a dynamic
variable, changing with time. This allows us to capture the behavioral charac-
teristics of agents that are behaving good for a certain time, but then suddenly
start misbehaving. Since an agent’s behavior can be changing with time it is
not necessarily the case that an agent is in the same state as it were at the last
encounter. An agent can only do its best guessing about the trustworthiness
state of an other agent based on its own previous direct experiences, which
were either good or bad, and recommendations or warnings from other agents
in the system. This means that the system state is hidden, and hence we use
the HMM approach.
We consider a decentralized reputation system where each agent updates its
own trust value for the other agents based on its own direct experiences, and
from feedback in the form of ratings communicated from other agents in the
multiagent system. We model the agent interaction as a stochastic process.
This means that we assume that there is a random time interval between each
agent interaction and that the behavior of an agent is only dependent on its
current state. When using a Markov model to model the state of an agent, we
make the following assumptions; all information about the agent is contained
in the state, observations are independent given the current state, and state
occupation time is negatively exponentially distributed.
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4.2 State Probability Distribution
From the HMM we can derive a prediction of the probability distribution
over the states, and we use the probability of being in the trusted state as
reputation value. Our modeling approach is different from the Beta model as
we do not assume that there is an underlying fixed probability p of getting a
good rating. Instead we assume that an agent is in one of the hidden states,
and that the ratings are characterized by different values of p dependent on
the current state of an agent. The rating process is similar to the monitoring
process in an intrusion detection system, and the challenge is to predict the
current state of an agent and detect a possible state change.
We have not made any assumptions about time between observations, and
there is no direct relation between observations and state-changes. As a con-
sequence the system could have made zero, one or more transitions during the
time between to successive observations. The time when observation number
k is produced is denoted tk. Time between observation k − 1 and observation
k is denoted δk = tk − tk−1.
The transition rate matrix Λ = (λij) is describing the dynamics of the
system. To simplify the notation we will use i and j instead of si and sj . The
relation between system states and the transition rates is given by
λij =
limdt→0
P (x(t+ dt) = j|x(t) = i)
dt
if i '= j∑N
j %=i,j=1−λij if i = j
. (6)
Since observations are received at irregular intervals, the running transition
probabilities pkij = P (x(t + δk) = j|x(t) = i) depend on the time since last
observation δk, and have to be calculated each time an observation is received.
The running transition probability matrix Pk = (pkij) can be derived from
Kolmogorov’s equations [Ros03] as follows
Pk = eΛδk . (7)
There are several analytical and numerical methods for solving these ordinary
differential equations, in our case the state space is very small, so calculations
are inexpensive. Let γk = (γk(i)) denote the prediction of the state probability
distribution at time tk given all observations received until time tk, γk(i) =
P (xk = i|yk) where yk = y1, . . . , yk. The algorithm for calculating γk is given
in [HMK08], it is an on-line algorithm derived from the forward-backward
procedure described in [Rab90], and is very efficient. It does not require the
agents to keep any history of past observations in memory.
4.3 Parameter Estimation
The parameters that need to be set in the HMM are the initial state distri-
bution pi, the observation symbol probabilities B and the state transition rates
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Λ. In [MTK08] we describe a method for learning the model parameters by the
combination of the machine learning technique reinforcement learning [SB98]
and the forward-backward procedure, which finds the maximum likelihood pa-
rameter estimate from a training sequence of observations. As this parameter
learning technique is not the main focus of this paper, we will assume that
these parameters are available to the model and perform the simulations with
a few different representative values for the parameters.
We will set the initial state distribution pi to be uniform over the states,
so we have that pi1 = 0.5 and pi2 = 0.5, in order to get the same starting
condition as the Beta model. But to overcome the problem of agents changing
their identities and re-entering the system frequently, it might be better to
change the starting condition so that a newcomer to the system is most likely
not in a trusted state.
The state transition rates can be calculated from estimated expected state
sojourn times H = (h1, h2), the relation between transition probabilities and
transition rates is given by
λij =
pij
hi
for i '= j. (8)
The transition rate models the tendency of the agent to change its trustwor-
thiness over time, large state transition rates will lead to faster response to
indications of state changes in the model.
The observation symbol probabilities models the uncertainty of the obser-
vations. If we for instance have the parameter b1(g) = 0.9, this means that
we have a probability of 0.1 of getting a good observation even though the
agent really is in an untrusted state. In other words we have a certainty of
90% of getting correct observations. Figure 3 shows how the hidden Markov
trust model responds to an input of 20 good followed by 20 bad observations
for different observation symbol probabilities. The time between observations
is fixed, and we have used the estimated state sojourn times h1 = 100, and
h2 = 100. We have used symmetric observation probabilities in this example,
i.e. if b1(g) = 0.9 we also have that b2(b) = 0.9.
As we can see from Figure 3, the observation symbol probabilities influ-
ence the response to state transitions in the model. This is natural, since
if the observations are unreliable, we would like to have more observations
indicating a state change before we believe that an actual state change has
occurred. It would make sense to assign a higher observation symbol probabil-
ity to the first-hand observations {g, b} than to the second-hand observations
{r, w}. For the second-hand observations we could choose to model each rec-
ommender separately, this means that we assign different observation symbol
probabilities {r, w} to every recommender. If we have a history of previous
recommendations and warnings coming from a specific recommender, we can
learn the parameters from this sequence of observations.
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Figure 3. The hidden Markov trust model with different observation probabilities, the
input is 20 good direct observations followed by 20 bad direct observations.
5. Simulation Results
In this section we will present some simulation results from our comparison
study of the hidden Markov trust model and the Beta reputation model. We
describe a selection of trust scenarios and compare the performance of the
models in these situations.
5.1 Simulation Assumptions and Parameters
When we do the comparison of the Beta model and the hidden Markov
trust model in the following, we will consider a decentralized version of the
Beta reputation system, where we let each agent calculate its own reputation
value for the other agents instead of calculating the reputation values in a
reputation centre. We assume that there is a trusted reliable communication
protocol in place that allows agents to obtain feedback from other agents in
the form of ratings.
For the model parameters, we have used the Beta model with a forgetting
factor φ = 0.9, and the hidden Markov trust model with state sojourn times
h1 = 100, h2 = 100 and observation symbol probabilities b1(g) = 0.8, b2(b) =
0.8. For the Beta model, we can see from Figure 2 that a high value of φ
gives the best response to state changes as it gives the largest variation in
the reputation value. Small values of φ seems to give quicker response, but
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Figure 4. The hidden Markov trust model compared to the Beta model, the input is 20
good observations followed by 20 bad observations.
leads to a convergence of the reputation score to a less extreme value. This
means that the reputation value becomes more average and does not clearly
distinguish between states. Since we want to model these state changes with
our hidden Markov trust model, we have used the Beta model with a high
value of φ. For the hidden Markov trust model, we have used relatively high
observation probabilities following the same reasoning. In the last simulation
we have used other parameters for the hidden Markov trust model, because
we want to illustrate the flexibility of the model by showing how we can adjust
the parameters so that it responds similarly to the Beta model.
5.2 Response to State Changes
We have already seen from Figures 2 and 3 how the two models respond to
a state change, we have 20 good observations followed by 20 bad observations.
In Figure 4 we see the difference between the models more clearly. Such
an input set of observations could come from a trust scenario where an agent
builds its reputation value by behaving good for a certain amount of time, and
then decides to take advantage of its good reputation by suddenly changing
its behavior. From Figure 4 we see that the slope of our model is much steeper
than the slope of the Beta model. The Beta model has a lower reputation value
for the first observation, but this is due to the slower convergence of the Beta
model to the good state. If we for instance had a threshold for detecting state
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Figure 5. The hidden Markov trust model compared to the Beta model, the input is 9
good observations, 1 bad observation at time t = 10, then no observations until time t = 35
followed by 5 bad observations.
changes at the reputation value 0.5, the hidden Markov trust model would
detect this already at the third bad observation while the Beta model would
detect it after six bad observations.
5.3 Time Component
The Beta model does not take the time component into consideration, it
only models the reputation value in terms of number of ratings. In the hidden
Markov trust model we include the time between observations in our model. To
illustrate the advantage of including the time aspect, we consider the following
scenario. We assume that an agent has been compromised, i.e. ’taken over’
by a malicious agent. The agent then proceeds with a strategy of ’laying low’,
meaning that is waits for a long time without acting malicious, so that when
it starts to show malicious behavior it can take full advantage of the good
reputation that the previous owner of the agent had built up. From Figure 5
we can see an example of such a scenario, where we have 9 good observations,
then one bad observation at time t = 10, then no observations until time
t = 35, followed by 5 bad observations. We can observe from the plot that the
hidden Markov trust model gives a steeper slope and continues the negative
trend over time, while the Beta model is just stretched at the x-axis.
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Figure 6. The hidden Markov trust model compared to the Beta model, the input is 10
good observations, followed by a disruptive behavior giving a pattern of 2 bad observations,
one good observation, 2 bad observations, and so on.
5.4 Disruptive Behavior
We want to see how the models react to a disruptive agent that changes
it strategy in order to adapt to the rules of threshold-based intrusion detec-
tion. In particular, we consider an agent that follows a pattern of misbehavior
adapted to a detection rule of ’three strikes and you’re out’. In Figure 6 we
have an example of this scenario, where an agent is showing good behavior
for 10 observations to build up its reputation, and then proceeds with the
disruptive behavior giving a pattern of 2 bad observations, one good obser-
vation, 2 bad observations, and so on. We can see from the plot that the
Beta model picks up this behavior with a decreasing reputation value, but the
hidden Markov trust model detects the state change faster and converges to
much lower trustworthiness values.
5.5 Model Flexibility
We have shown some examples where the hidden Markov trust model per-
forms better than the Beta model in detecting state changes. This is not very
surprising as the Beta model is not based on the assumption that agents can
be in different states when it comes to trustworthiness. The performance of
both models is of course dependent on the model parameters. The Beta model
in the variant that we used in our simulations has fewer parameters than the
Paper F: Comparison of the Beta and the HMM Models of Trust 139
Figure 7. The hidden Markov trust model compared to the Beta model, the parameters of
the models have been adjusted to make them respond similarly, input is 20 good observations
followed by 20 bad observations, 20 good observations and so on.
hidden Markov trust model, albeit we have included the forgetting factor as
a parameter in order to study the variant of the Beta model which is most
sensitive to dynamic behavior. We used the parameters that seemed to give
the most beneficial results for both models.
Now we want to illustrate the flexibility of the hidden Markov trust model,
by adjusting its parameters so that it responds similarly to the Beta model.
The results of this adjustment can be seen in Figure 7. We have used the Beta
model with a forgetting factor of φ = 0.7, and adjusted the parameters of our
model to make it respond close to the Beta model. For the hidden Markov
trust model we have used the observation symbol probabilities b1(g) = 0.6,
b1(b) = 0.4, b2(b) = 0.6 and b2(g) = 0.4. We also adjusted the state sojourn
times to h1 = 8 and h2 = 8. The hidden Markov trust model with these
parameters describes a situation where observations are very uncertain and
state transition rates are high. With such parameters we could say that the
state modeling aspect of our model has been suppressed.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
We have seen from the simulated examples that the Beta model and the
hidden Markov trust model performs differently. We will now explain the
fundamental differences between the two models, and discuss the findings from
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the simulations in this light. The hidden Markov model assumes an underlying
state, observations are uncertain and we have an uncertainty of which state
an agent is in. The Beta model does not assume that an agent is either good
or bad, but rather seeks to pinpoint the trustworthiness of an agent on a
continuous scale from 0 to 1. The interpretations of the observations in this
model are deterministic. The difference between the models can be seen as
an analogy to the difference between fuzzy sets and probabilities. In fuzzy
logic an agent can be partially trusted, in the sense that he is 70% honest and
30% dishonest. This is different from a situation where we are 70% certain
that an agent is 100% honest. This fundamental difference between the two
models explains why the hidden Markov model performs better when it comes
to the detection of changes in behavior of the agents over time. While the
hidden Markov model recognizes a state transition, the Beta model is instead
modeling an agent that gradually becomes partially more dishonest. This
difference is clearly demonstrated in the simulation illustrated in Figure 6,
where we consider an agent with a disruptive strategy. Additionally, we have
the effect of the different time constants in the models. While the Beta model
is relying on the ’lifetime’ of old observations, the time constant in the hidden
Markov trust model is associated with the underlying state transition process.
The hidden Markov trust model has more parameters then the Beta model,
thus it can be more fine-tuned and adaptable to dynamic environments.
However, this also leads to challenges related to the parameter estimation.
In [MTK08] it is discussed how its parameters can be learned using a
combination of the machine learning technique reinforcement learning [SB98]
and the forward-backward procedure [Rab90], which finds the maximum
likelihood parameter estimate. Both the Beta model and the hidden Markov
trust model can be further refined by introducing more dimensions or states.
The multinomial Bayesian models, which allow for graded ratings, introduce
more dimensions to the Bayesian modeling. It would have been interesting
comparing a multinomial Bayesian trust model to a hidden Markov trust
model with more states and more observation symbols. However, such a
comparison would be challenging due to the big number of parameters that
would need to be managed in the simulations. Including trust transitivity
between different contexts is also an important issue that should be addressed
in future work.
We have presented a comparison of the hidden Markov trust model and
the Beta reputation system. Due to its larger richness in model features, the
hidden Markov trust model shows a better ability to deal with dynamic envi-
ronments, where we are unable to obtain perfect information and agents can
be assumed to change their behavior over time. However, the increased model
complexity also leads to larger challenges in finding representative parameters
for the model. A disadvantage of both models might be that they are not eas-
ily understandable to human users, since they build on much more advanced
mathematics than the simple eBay-like systems. These models are therefore
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maybe better suited for applications in multiagent systems, routing protocols
and other distributed networking environments with non-human interpreters
of the trustworthiness calculations.
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